

william demington jr.



david feld



john bryant



Ohio's Civil War Governors

by richard h. abbott

with an introduction by william b. hesseltine

OHIO CIVIL WAR CENTENNIAL COMMISSION

OHIO'S WAR GOVERNORS

RICHARD H ABBOTT

With an Introduction by

WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS
FOR
THE OHIO HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Publications of the
Ohio Civil War Centennial Commission
No. 11

- No. 1: *Under the Flag of the Nation: Diaries and Letters of a Yankee Volunteer in the Civil War*, edited by Otto F. Bond. 320 pp., \$5.00 (clothbound).
- No. 2: *Ohio Troops in the Field*, by Edward T. Downer. 34 pp., \$.75 (paperbound).
- No. 3: *The Ohio Press in the Civil War*, by Robert S. Harper. 35 pp., \$.75 (paperbound).
- No. 4: *Ohio Politics on the Eve of Conflict*, by Henry H. Simms. 34 pp., \$.75 (paperbound).
- No. 5: *Ohio Forms an Army*, by Harry L. Coles. 26 pp., \$.75 (paperbound).
- No. 6: *Ohio Negroes in the Civil War*, by Charles H. Wesley. 46 pp., \$.75 (paperbound).
- No. 7: *Ohio Agriculture during the Civil War*, by Robert L. Jones. 25 pp., \$.75 (paperbound).
- No. 8: *Civil War Letters of Petroleum V. Nasby*, compiled, with an Introduction, by Harvey S. Ford. 34 pp., \$.75 (paperbound).
- No. 9: *Cincinnati during the Civil War*, by Louis Leonard Tucker. 42 pp., \$.75 (paperbound).
- No. 10: *Cleveland during the Civil War*, by Kenneth E. Davison. 32 pp., \$.75 (paperbound).

INTRODUCTION

THE GOVERNORSHIP of an American state during the Civil War was a difficult and frustrating position filled with responsibilities, and furnishing few rewards either personally or politically. The necessities of armed combat, the raising and care of troops, the mustering of men and money produced, almost inevitably, confusion and adverse reactions. Few were the governors of American states who survived the war with reputations unimpaired. During the years of the great American conflict, there were sixty-three men who held office as governors of the Northern states. Only a handful were acclaimed later for having been "great War Governors." Oliver P. Morton in Indiana, John A. Andrew in Massachusetts, and Andrew G. Curtin in Pennsylvania receive such a popular accolade, but the great majority—James T. Lewis in Wisconsin, Stephen A. Miller in Minnesota, Samuel J. Kirkwood and William M. Stone in Iowa, for example—were lost from popular memory. Few governors were re-elected—and few were even renominated by their parties. The duties and obligations of the governorship—even when they were faithfully executed—brought little satisfaction to the public and less to the unfortunate men who managed the affairs of the states in time of turmoil.

In a larger sense, the Civil War brought a subtle but substantial change in federal-state relations. The federal union, which Abraham Lincoln swore to uphold and for whose defense he first called upon the states for troops, was made up of "sovereign" states jealous of

INTRODUCTION

their distinctive powers and rights. Under the exigencies of war—a war waged for a national purpose—the rights of the states became subordinate to the powers of the nation, and a "New Nation" emerged from the Civil War. In many instances the growing power of the national government and the weakening role of the states brought conflict between state and federal officers. Ohio's Civil War history, however, was marked by no serious clashes between her governors and the national administration. Instead, there was a remarkable harmony, and the constitutional transition was made easier because Ohio's governors could act as a mediating influence. With one accord, they co-operated with Lincoln and the Washington authorities. They were neither radicals trying to push the government to extreme positions, nor obstructionists attempting to preserve an old and untenable independence.

Three in number were the governors of Ohio, and none of them won or warranted the title of "great." They were, each in his own way, efficient and competent. Each was diligent, patriotic, devoted, and hardworking. Yet, none of them was popular, none was re-elected or renominated. Their very competence and diligence, of tremendous importance to the nation in its hour of extremity, cost them the reward of public acclaim. Yet, of the sixty-three governors of Northern states, William Dennison, David Tod, and John Brough were among the more able, the more diligent, and the more dependable.

WILLIAM B. HESSELTINE

Richard H. Abbott, born in Petersburg, Illinois, received his B.A. degree from Grinnell College in 1958, his M.A. degree in history from the University of Missouri in 1959, and is currently a research assistant at the University of Wisconsin.

Ohio's War Governors

RICHARD H. ABBOTT

WILLIAM DENNISON

THE BEGINNING of the Civil War found William Dennison occupying the governor's office in the capitol in Columbus. He had been elected in 1859; and although there were rumors of war and mounting sectional tensions, no one had really believed that war was imminent; and no one thought of selecting candidates for governor on the basis of their ability to manage state affairs in time of war. Instead, William Dennison owed his nomination by the Republican party to his eminent availability and the absence of any conspicuous rivals for the honor.

The two administrations of Salmon P. Chase, Ohio's first Republican governor, had served to establish the new Republican party in Ohio. It was a party made up of diverse elements: old Whigs who were committed to the ancient "American System" of Henry Clay, ardent abolitionists from the Western Reserve, rising industrialists from the burgeoning communities close to iron and coal deposits, and railroad promoters who envisioned systems of iron rails which could connect Ohio's rivers and lakes and carry its products even across the Alleghenies. There was a tinge of temperance in the party and more than a trace of soreheads who had been rejected by the more conservative elements which dominated the Democratic party. By 1857, too, there were Know-Nothings, who hated foreigners and feared the Roman Church, coming to rest in Republican ranks. In 1855, Salmon P. Chase—who had been a Democrat and a Liberty party man, then a Free Soiler, and even a Democrat again, but who had always been an outspoken enemy of slavery—won the governorship on the Republican ticket. Re-elected in 1857, Chase devoted his time to organizing the Republicans, ironing out the disagreements

in their ranks, and marshalling them into an effective political unit. There were, true enough, great personal rivalries among the leading Republicans, but the party was, essentially, the representative of reform and of progress. It appealed to business men and industrial laborers—new elements in Ohio society—rather than to the older agricultural and commercial interests.¹

By 1859, the Republicans had achieved political experience and sufficient cohesion to enable Chase to go to the United States Senate. His departure made way for William Dennison, a man who had been a Whig in politics and one of the original organizers, along with Chase, of the Republican party. He was a native of Cincinnati, a graduate of Miami University where he had excelled in history and belles lettres, and a lawyer who had practiced with conspicuous success. He had been a banker, and was director and president of a railroad. He had served in the state senate where he had stood firmly against the state's Black Laws and had spoken against the Buchanan administration's efforts to extend slavery into the territories. He had opposed the annexation of Texas, the war with Mexico, and the Compromise of 1850. His interests were broad. He organized a county agricultural society, served on the Columbus city council, and helped establish an iron rolling mill in the capital. Though he was not as prominent as Chase, his antislavery record was clear, and he shared with his predecessor an impressive demeanor—even an air of pomposity—and very considerable ability. His nomination by the Republicans came, however, almost by default and not from any appreciation of his qualities. Most of Ohio's prominent Republicans were in Congress and Dennison was simply available. He won the nomination without significant opposition.²

In 1859, Ohioans faced several economic problems that could have played a role in the gubernatorial campaign, but both political parties preferred instead to concentrate on national issues. Rather than attempting to reconcile conflicting opinions within their parties on such questions as the disposal of the state canal system, an independent treasury, and taxation of state banks, both Republicans and Democrats discussed the Fugitive Slave law and the federal courts. Democrats also raised the issue of free Negroes in Ohio, asserting that anyone with a "visible admixture" of African blood should not be allowed to vote. They condemned Republican-sponsored personal liberty laws that hindered enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act and demanded that state officers fulfill their constitutional obligations by remanding escaped slaves captured within Ohio's borders. Republicans, dropping their earlier emphasis on restricting slavery expansion, crusaded against

the Fugitive Slave law and demanded reforms in the federal court system that would give better representation to the various sections of the country. Radical Republicans also prevented the renomination of Chief Justice Joseph R. Swan to the State Supreme Court, because he had, in May, upheld the constitutionality of the disputed fugitive law. Although Joshua Giddings, abolitionist Congressman from the Western Reserve, exulted at his party's radical course, Abraham Lincoln, who would be Republican presidential nominee in 1860, disapproved of the Ohio party's actions. He felt that such a struggle against the Constitution would greatly endanger the Republican cause in the nation.³

The Democrats selected Rufus P. Ranney, an able lawyer and former Supreme Court judge, to oppose Dennison and brought Stephen A. Douglas, the country's leading Democrat, into the state to speak for him; Republicans countered by importing Lincoln to stump for Dennison. Although the Republican gubernatorial candidate surprised fellow politicians with his success in debating Ranney during a stump tour across the state, Dennison later would prove more suited to issuing platitudes against slavery extension and Supreme Court decisions than to rallying a state under the stress of war. Dennison won this political test and defeated his rival by 13,236 votes, about the average majority for Republican gubernatorial candidates. The Republican party also carried the rest of the state offices and won back control of both houses of the state assembly. This legislature, with Republicans outnumbering Democrats 25 to 10 in the Senate and 58 to 46 in the House, would be in session at the opening of the Civil War.⁴

Unfortunately for Dennison, the majority of Ohioans gave him their votes but not their hearts. The suave, well-mannered gentleman seemed to most citizens to be a vain and haughty aristocrat. Among railroad men and bank officers, Dennison had a reputation for financial ability and a capacity for controlling large operations; but he never was able to reach outside his small circle of friends to gather the popular support he needed as governor. To the end of his life, only a few men knew Dennison well; most found him impersonal and austere. In the months ahead, when the governor sought to mobilize Ohio for war, he lacked the full support of the state; Ohioans proved to be quick with criticism and slow with praise.⁵

During the campaign debates, Dennison had spoken well; but after the returns were in, his speeches became prolix and stilted. His inaugural address, delivered January 9, 1860, was long and verbose. The new governor surveyed many subjects: he launched an attack on slavery, claimed the western territories for freedom, condemned secessionist plots, and prophesied that the West would soon be in control

of the federal government. Though he promised Ohio would support the Constitution with all its compromises and would protect the rights and property of citizens of other states, he denied the Union was an instrument to propagate human slavery, and he criticized Supreme Court decisions which asserted the right of property in men. Dennison ended his address with a plea for colonization of free Negroes. Despite the wide sweep of Dennison's message, one of his unfortunate phrases attracted most of the publicity; he solemnly stated that if the South seceded, a standing army "would be the succedaneum for the security conferred by a common government." Henceforth he was known, even to important Republican newspapers, as the "succedaneum Governor."⁶

In one of his first official actions as governor, Dennison had an opportunity to appear as the conciliator of sections when, late in January, the legislatures of Kentucky and Tennessee visited Ohio. The recently completed Louisville and Nashville railroad had just joined the capitals of the two states; and, when their respective legislatures met in Louisville to celebrate the event, Dennison invited them to cross the Ohio and come to Columbus. Dennison there capped a series of speeches proclaiming the common interests of the three states by promising that Ohio would recognize the right of people in every state to establish and maintain undisturbed their domestic institutions. The sovereignty of the states had to be maintained, he declared, in all matters not clearly designated to the federal government.⁷

Despite such attempts to achieve harmony through oratory, actions proved more indicative of the future relations between the border states. The Kentucky legislature had no more returned home than it drew up and passed a law to reorganize and strengthen the state militia. In March, Dennison refused to consider the request of Beriah Magoffin, Kentucky's governor, to return two men charged with helping to free a slave. A few days earlier, Dennison had denied a similar appeal from another neighboring governor, John Letcher of Virginia, who asked that Ohio return two members of John Brown's raiding party. In both cases Dennison based his refusal to extradite on the grounds that the offenses for which the fugitives were to answer did not rank among those listed in the Constitution. Ohio Democrats quickly made an issue of Dennison's failure to ease the distrust of neighboring slave states and later sought to embarrass him by trying to pass a bill compelling the governor to deliver fugitives on request—this attempt failed. Despite harassment from Democratic and conservative quarters, Dennison had quickly and clearly indicated

he would not go beyond oratory in any attempt to conciliate the southern states.⁸

Shortly after Dennison took office, the preliminaries of the 1860 presidential campaign began to reveal internal dissensions in both the Republican and Democratic parties. Among Ohio's Republicans, there were supporters of New York Senator William H. Seward, the newly elected Senator Chase, and Senator Ben Wade from the Western Reserve. At one time or another, the governor seemed to favor each of the aspirants. In April, he visited Washington, attended a dinner at Seward's, entered the floor of the Senate as Chase's guest, and laughed affably with Seward. By the time the Republican National Convention met in Chicago's Wigwam, Governor Dennison was on hand to tell reporters he preferred Seward if one of Ohio's senators could not be nominated; but cynical observers concluded that he favored Wade primarily because he hoped to be elevated to the Senate should Wade be translated to the White House. Ohio's delegation to Chicago was sharply divided, but at the last moment Chase's floor manager announced the change of four votes from Chase to Lincoln and thereby gave Illinois' favorite son the nomination. Dennison was content enough with the result, and returned to Ohio to work for the party's nominee.

With the national Democratic party seriously divided, the Republicans had little trouble carrying Ohio for Lincoln. In October, the state elections returned Republicans with greater majorities than in the previous year; and in November, even southern counties, which were conservative on slavery issues but which were attracted by the promises of a tariff to protect coal and iron, added to Lincoln's plurality of 40,000 over Democrat Stephen A. Douglas.⁹

During the "secession winter" of 1860-61, Governor Dennison and the Ohio legislature faced the problems of a dividing nation and emerged with divided counsel. The governor watched carefully the rising tide of disunionism in neighboring Kentucky, and he carefully prepared his January message to the legislature with a view to strengthening unionist sentiment there. He favored, he said, the repeal of state personal liberty laws and the elimination of the "offensive and derogatory clauses"—the "obnoxious features"—of the federal fugitive slave law. He thought that the "discontents" which had grown up between the sections ought to be reconciled, and he was willing that the Free States should take the first steps in making conciliatory gestures. Although he felt obliged to defend his refusal to cooperate with his neighbors in extraditing "criminals" to Kentucky and Virginia, the governor conveniently recalled the legislative visit

of the previous year and its rhetorical harmony. He was, he assured his listeners, strongly in favor of the Constitution and the abrogation of all laws contravening rights of their fellow citizens below the Ohio; he was willing to yield everything to the South that "may be consistent with right, justice, humanity and the demands of a Christian civilization." Then, having declared his willingness to go the second mile, he denounced secession, declared secessionists were traitors, demanded enforcement of the laws, and added that Ohio would not allow hostile communities to cut off the Mississippi. He also asked the legislature to strengthen the state militia organization.¹⁰

The legislature responded with equal confusion. In Washington, conciliators were working for compromise, and the legislature asked Congress to call a convention to amend the Constitution. Republicans in caucus agreed on a set of resolutions declaring that the people of Ohio opposed "meddling with the internal affairs of other states," and suggested that the states should repeal any legislation conflicting with the Constitution or laws of the United States. They asserted also that the strength of the national government had to be maintained and pledged the entire power and resources of Ohio for that purpose. Democrats failed to amend the resolutions with disavowals of intent to coerce the South. The Senate also defeated a proposed effort to reconcile sectional differences by sending commissioners from the free states along the border to the nearby slave states.¹¹

When Virginia called a peace conference in Washington, Dennison consulted with fellow governors John Andrew, of Massachusetts, and Richard Yates, of Illinois, asking them if they were sending delegates. He urged Yates to refuse acceptance of the conference proposal at least until Lincoln was inaugurated. When the governor submitted the Virginia proposals to the Ohio legislature, he pronounced the terms of adjustment "inadmissable" and regretted that the Virginians had made no mention of reliance on an unaltered Constitution. After a lengthy debate between Republican radicals and conservatives, the legislature agreed to accept the invitation and, on January 30, authorized Dennison to select commissioners for the conference. The governor appointed six Republicans and only one Democrat, but their opinions ranged from old-line Whiggery to abolitionism. In general, Buckeye radicals felt Dennison had appointed a conservative delegation; Chase, one of the delegates, considered himself the only member not prepared to go for compromise. Although Dennison later added another radical to the commission when one of its original members died in Washington, the Ohioans approved every section of the compromise resolutions. However, both houses of Congress

rejected the proposals, and when they were submitted in the Ohio House, legislators tabled them.¹²

While conciliation was in the air, President-elect Abraham Lincoln visited Ohio on his way to Washington. On his fifty-second birthday, the incoming chief executive stopped in Cincinnati and the next day made his way to Columbus. His remarks before the legislature and from the back of trains were as inconclusive as Dennison's pronouncements had been. Referring to the sectional crisis, Lincoln assured Ohioans that "it is a good thing that there is no more than anxiety, for there is nothing going wrong." Dennison and other prominent Republicans were disappointed at his remarks, which contained no hint of future policy.¹³

The confusions of the winter were not resolved until Lincoln sent supplies to Fort Sumter and the Confederates opened fire upon the fort. In Ohio, the first weeks of the Lincoln administration were enlivened by a contest in the legislature over the selection of a senator to take the place of Chase, whom Lincoln had taken into his cabinet. Dennison was an active and hopeful candidate; his supporters in the Republican caucus included many "irrepressibles" from the Western Reserve who stood by him for seventy-eight ballots. However, many radical Republicans preferred John Sherman, and eventually they managed to get the caucus to name him. On March 21, a joint convention of the two houses elected Sherman to the Senate. Dennison's ambitions for a Senate seat did not abate; but when he did go to Washington, he went as a cabinet member not as Senator.¹⁴

The following month, the intricacies of politics and the rivalries of politicians gave way momentarily to the new issues of raising armies and furnishing supplies for the war. Yet the wounds of political controversy were not healed, and Dennison was to suffer from them as he turned his attention to military affairs. On April 15, three days after the firing on Fort Sumter, Lincoln called for 75,000 militia to suppress "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." Dennison immediately wired Washington to inquire about Ohio's quota under the call and to assure Lincoln that there was "great rejoicing here over your proclamation." On the same day, after learning from the Secretary of War how many troops were expected from him, Dennison issued a series of proclamations calling for thirteen regiments or 10,153 men. He asked the people of Ohio to rise above all party bias in order to uphold free institutions, the Union, and the state of Ohio. The response was immediate and enthusiastic; mass meetings resolved to support the Union cause, and David Tod, one of

the state's leading Democrats who within a year would hold Dennison's job, promised Lincoln that 200,000 Ohio Democrats would stand by him in crushing treason and rebellion.¹⁵

The call for arms imposed new duties on the governor. As commander-in-chief of the state militia, he had to perfect its organization and get troops into the field as quickly as possible; he also had to guarantee the state full protection from any suspected invasion. His position as chief executive demanded that he recommend appropriate measures to the legislature to prepare the state for war, provision its troops, and guarantee funds for purchasing arms and equipment. Finally, as state Republican leader, he had to conciliate differences within his party and gain its full support in marshalling Ohio's resources for the conflict. In accordance with his obligations, on April 16 Dennison asked the General Assembly for an appropriation of \$450,000 to purchase arms and equipment for the volunteer militia and requested prompt organization and arming of the state's military forces. The legislature, not without violent debate, promptly passed a bill appropriating one million dollars for the purpose of protecting the national government and arming the state militia. Further legislation followed; and by the time the legislature adjourned on May 13, it had authorized the governor to accept new regiments to aid the federal government or to fend off invasion, forbidden the transportation of contraband through the state, provided for the relief of militia families, passed a measure to define and punish treason against the state of Ohio, and had reorganized the militia, increased the governor's staff, and appointed additional general officers.¹⁶

Despite prompt action on the part of the legislature, Dennison had to struggle through a mass of difficulties. Although his predecessor had made an effort to reform the militia, regimental organization existed only on paper. In late 1860, Adjutant-General H. B. Carrington had reported that he could not, under any emergency, collect more than 1200 men suitably equipped and prepared for duty. At that time, Carrington declared that the system Governor Chase had set up was useless without legislative appropriations; although some attempts had been made to raise the needed money, on April 15, 1861, nothing had been accomplished. When Dennison discovered that the state had only a few boxes of smooth-bore muskets, some worn-out six-pounders, and a pile of mildewed harness for armaments, he sent agents to Illinois, Massachusetts, and New York to purchase weapons. He also commissioned a Massachusetts agent sailing for England to buy Enfield rifles for Ohio and bombarded Secretary of War Simon Cameron with requests for ordnance.¹⁷

Dennison also had personnel problems; he had retained Chase's military staff, never dreaming at the beginning of his administration that these men might have anything important to do. The staff proved hardly prepared for its tasks. Some members had no executive ability, others no tact, and few commanded the confidence of Ohio's volunteer soldiers. As soon as he realized his mistake, Dennison undertook a reorganization of the staff and requested that Cameron send him a West Pointer to run his military establishment. The Secretary curtly refused. Frantic for the assistance of someone with military ability, Dennison accepted the advice of a delegation from Cincinnati and appointed George B. McClellan major-general of the Ohio militia.¹⁸

Despite Ohio's complete lack of preparedness, her quota of volunteers was rapidly filled as enthusiasm for the war swept through the state. Several independent companies of volunteer infantry from Columbus, Cleveland, and other larger cities led the way, and soon Dennison was embarrassed with an excess of men. His adjutant-general, frantic before the swarm of volunteers pouring into the capital, accepted too many regiments. Dennison had to plead with Cameron to accept more than Ohio's quota. Instead of the thirteen regiments requested, Dennison was organizing twenty-two; he told Cameron he could not stop short of that number "without seriously repressing the ardor of the people." Cameron turned down the extra regiments, but the Ohio legislature came to Dennison's aid by authorizing him to take the additional troops into state service. Even then, Carrington had to disband thirty volunteer companies and warn others not to come to Columbus.¹⁹

Seeking to clarify his problems and to co-ordinate his activities with those of his neighbors, Dennison went to Cleveland early in May to meet with the governors of Indiana, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan; agents from Illinois and New York also attended. Dennison, who had called the meeting, welcomed his counterparts, and together they determined that the government in Washington needed their combined wisdom. The Ohio governor complained that Lincoln had neither plans for defending the Northern border states nor for prosecuting a vigorous war against the South. He wanted permission to march his troops into Kentucky and Virginia and hoped for orders from Washington to stop exports of provisions into the slave states. Impatiently, Dennison declared that the time for speaking had passed; he demanded an aggressive war. The governors agreed with Dennison's sentiments and sent messages to Lincoln pledging their support for every measure, no matter how extreme, to put down the rebellion.

Now that Washington was safe, they demanded the President give more attention to the safety of the border free states.

Lincoln responded immediately to the governor's attempt to formulate war policy. On the day after the Cleveland conference, he called for forty regiments of three-year volunteers, to be "subject to the laws and regulations governing the Army of the United States." The governors could still commission officers, but the President would direct and control the army. From now on Dennison would be so busy raising troops for Lincoln that he would have little time for further conferences.²⁰

Lincoln's request for troops found Dennison already in considerable difficulty trying to care for the regiments raised under the first militia call. In answer to Cameron's pleas, he sent two regiments to Washington without arms, uniforms, or equipment. Rail communications with the capital were disorganized and Ohio troops were delayed in Pennsylvania. Since the regiments had not had an opportunity to elect officers, Dennison sent a Democrat, George W. McCook, to Pennsylvania to lead the troops on to the capital. Republicans immediately raged at the appointment, but their anger became even greater as they considered the situation of the militia regiments still in Ohio. The first companies to reach the state capital found no quarters prepared for them; Dennison's commissary general, George W. Runyan, met this problem with an old solution—he lodged them in the city's hotels, which had patriotically lowered their rates to \$1.25 a day. The troops also had to eat; Runyan contracted with a local restaurateur to feed the soldiers at fifty cents a day. Unfortunately, the contractor's facilities were more adequate for serving ladies' auxiliaries than hundreds of hungry troops; soldiers soon complained that they had to wait three hours for breakfast. While militiamen sighed over cold flapjacks, state legislators screamed about excessive contracting costs and demanded Dennison remove incompetents on his staff.²¹

The governor hurriedly took steps to avert further criticism by reorganizing his staff, appointing McClellan to take charge of the state volunteers, and establishing several military camps in Columbus and Cincinnati to handle the increasing numbers of troops. McClellan set up the largest of these posts outside Cincinnati, named it—unfortunately for the governor—Camp Dennison and ordered volunteers from Columbus for organization and training. On April 29, the first troops poured into Camp Dennison to be greeted by a heavy rain which turned the camp into a swamp. Since no cooks could be found, the men had to prepare their own food; a contractor provided water

which he drew from a well next to a slaughterhouse. Soon, disease struck down half the camp, while the other half lacked adequate housing, blankets, uniforms, and arms. Dennisons's agent in New York, pressed hard for provisions, sent back large quantities of the first supplies he could find; the men hoping for clothing, guns, and ammunition, found he had sent tent poles. The governor, anxious to have his constituents satisfied, allowed his agents to pay high prices for supplies. Outraged legislators demanded investigations and accused Dennison of favoritism in handing out provisioning contracts. Even Republican newspapers took up the cry against the governor; and McClellan, who had full responsibility for Camp Dennison and its disorders, said nothing.²²

In the midst of the chaos came Lincoln's May call for three-year volunteers. The war department gave the state executives the job of raising and organizing the new regiments; Cameron made no provision for transportation, pay, or subsistence for the regiments while they were forming and gave their officers no authority until their units were filled and mustered. Until the regiments were completed, the state government had to provide for the troops; this led to further complaints of lack of clothing and shelter. Upon pressure from Dennison, Cameron finally agreed to muster in the men in small squads so that the federal government could furnish them subsistence.²³

As Dennison set about raising recruits, he found Cameron had authorized men to enlist troops in Ohio independent of his own authority. When he learned Cameron had allowed W. G. Sherwin to raise a regiment of artillery in the state, he hastily wrote the Secretary, "For God's sake withdraw the authority. Such a commission will make a farce of the public service." He warned Cameron it would be impossible to pursue any system in organizing troops in Ohio if he authorized men to raise recruits outside the discretion and direction of the governor. Dennison became further irritated at news that General John C. Fremont had agents in Ohio to enlist troops in his command. The governor refused to dispatch troops to Fremont in Missouri until Lincoln ordered it done. The President also had to ask the governor to commission Fremont's regimental officers. Finally, at Dennison's continued urging, Cameron gave him complete control over all regiments being organized in the state. At this news, one of Fremont's agents complained to Lincoln that if the order were enforced, the government would lose several thousand men who "will not have anything to do with Governor Dennison." General Don Carlos Buell thought Dennison interpreted his powers too broad-

ly; he complained to McClellan, "The Governor evidently looks upon all Ohio troops as his army I shall stop all this sort of thing."²⁴

Dennison, undaunted by criticism, moved to implement his recruiting powers and set up committees to supervise recruiting in each county and congressional district. These committees supplied speakers, held public rallies, kept an eye on recruiting officers, and approved candidates for commissions in the new regiments. Dennison also instructed them to keep him advised of "the existence and influence of any secret organization of men opposed to the war." The governor worried about treasonable activities, and in a proclamation issued August 29, calling for recruits, he warned against any suggestions "for negotiation or compromise with armed rebellion." There would be no peace or adjustment, he declared, without the complete surrender of the rebels to the federal government.²⁵

Under the repeated calls issued before and after the Cleveland conference, Dennison could raise Ohio's quota both by re-enlisting the three-month militia for three years and by signing up new regiments. Thus, on May 17, he called on the three-month volunteers to re-enlist, praising them for their endurance despite an admittedly "hurried, and necessarily imperfect organization of the army." The militia regiments gathered at Camp Dennison, where they were to reorganize. Unfortunately, the reorganization came only after considerable difficulty. By state law, the three-month militia had elected their own officers; under the May 4 call, the governor was to appoint them. Many soldiers, dismayed by this invasion of their rights, refused to re-enlist. They mingled in camp with the three-year volunteers, disrupting discipline and adding to the overcrowding and chaos. Although Dennison urged that the three-month men who refused to re-enlist be mustered out, the regimental commanders sent them home on furlough without discharge or pay. Between two and three thousand men thus spread over the state, angry and dissatisfied with both the army and the governor.²⁶

Dennison had complained that the federal government lacked initiative; when Lincoln replied to this complaint with a call for volunteers, the Ohio governor faced difficulties financial as well as military. As he struggled to fill the state quotas and keep the troops supplied before the federal government took over the provisioning, he rapidly exhausted funds appropriated by the legislature. Certainly some of the expenditures were questionable: the editor of the *Lebanon Citizen* wondered why obstetrical instruments were included in a \$20,000 appropriation for army surgical equipment, noting that "this is a highly pregnant fact!" However, much of the expense was unavoidable.

able as the federal government moved slowly in providing for troops mustered into its service, and disturbances at Camp Dennison delayed recruitment. When the federal government finally repaid Ohio for expenses accumulated in raising troops for the United States, the state auditor decided that such reimbursements could not be used again for military expenditure without another legislative appropriation. Dennison, not willing to convene the General Assembly while his administration was facing strong criticism, sent his own agents to Washington, cut off the money before it reached the state treasury, and expended it to feed, clothe, and arm the state soldiery. In this manner the governor distributed over one million dollars refunded by the federal government. Although Dennison kept careful account of all money spent, the extra-legal means he used brought an additional storm of criticism.²⁷

At Cleveland, Dennison had not only called for a vigorous prosecution of the war, he also wanted the federal government to formulate a policy for defending the border free states. From the beginning of hostilities, the Ohio governor had worried about an invasion from below the Ohio River; in attempting to avert that possibility, he alternately followed a policy of pacifying and coercing the Southern border. On May 13, he asked the General Assembly for an appropriation of \$30,000 to aid Unionists in Missouri, but the legislature turned him down, and Dennison had to leave that problem to Governor Richard Yates, of Illinois. Kentucky was closer at hand, and required more immediate attention. Since the beginning of the year, Dennison had kept agents in his neighbor state to help strengthen the Union cause. In April, worried Cincinnatians requested 10,000 men to keep Kentucky from placing batteries on bluffs across the river; the informants wanted the governor to garrison Cincinnati and protect her railroads from sabotage. Dennison quickly got permission from Cameron to make the city a rendezvous for troops and asked him to send heavy guns down from Pittsburg. However, on April 23, when a delegation from Louisville protested that Cincinnati "Home Guards" were seizing goods moving through the city to Kentucky, Dennison sent a letter to Cincinnati, stating that "so long as any state remains in the Union, with professions of attachment to it, we cannot discriminate between that State and our own." At the moment, Dennison had an agent in Louisville, consulting with Governor Magoffin about maintaining Kentucky's neutrality, and he did not want to endanger the negotiations by any overt acts.²⁸

Although by April 23 Dennison's agent in Louisville had opened up a "friendly and frank communication" with Magoffin, the Ohio

governor preferred to believe reports of Kentucky's hostility rather than rumors of its friendliness. On April 25, Dennison faced a decision on his Kentucky policy. He received a wire from Magoffin, asking if Dennison and Governor Oliver P. Morton, of Indiana, would co-operate with him in an effort to bring peace between the warring sections. Dennison consulted Morton, and the two governors agreed to hold a conference with Magoffin in Cincinnati. When the Kentucky governor, hesitant about entering Ohio, sent an agent, Colonel Thomas Crittenden, instead of attending personally, the two northern governors refused to meet him. Dennison wrote Crittenden that "believing the General Government to be wholly in the right, I can see no reason for the interposition suggested." He and Morton would negotiate only with Magoffin, and only for the purpose of uniting in a call for the seceded states to return to the Union. "Any other solution is impossible and a truce would only aggravate the impending evils." Magoffin, on hearing of the governors' decision, left for Cincinnati, only to find that Dennison and Morton had hurried away.²⁹

Now Dennison, determined to end further attempts to conciliate Kentucky, moved to keep contraband from crossing the Ohio. On April 29, he notified express and railroad companies not to carry any arms, munitions, or other contraband out of the state; he had already taken possession of telegraph lines in Ohio to prevent any dissemination of troop movements. Although the state legislature had authorized him to appoint inspectors to stop shipments of arms and munitions going into the slave states, Dennison eventually decided to leave this delicate matter to the federal authorities.³⁰

When it appeared to Dennison that the Cleveland conference had not affected the federal government's border-state policy, he called a meeting with Governors Yates and Morton at Indianapolis. There, ignoring Magoffin's earlier compromise attempts, he spoke of Kentucky's defiant attitude and urged that the federal government seize prominent points in the state—Louisville, Paducah, Covington, Newport—and the railroads leading to them from the south. This move, he maintained, would save Kentucky for the Union, end the threat of invasion into the northern free states, and strengthen the loyalists in Tennessee. The governors agreed on Dennison's recommendations and stressed the importance of a campaign plan for the West. After signing a memorial to send to Washington, Dennison returned home. From now on he would let Morton worry about Kentucky; he wanted to attend to the Unionist cause in western Virginia.³¹

The western counties of Virginia were already simmering with

discontent. On April 30, Secretary Chase in Washington urged Dennison to encourage a convention of Unionists by massing Ohio troops across the river from Wheeling, Virginia. Dennison had anticipated Chase. Already he had assured Virginia Unionists that Ohio would protect them if they broke off from secessionist Virginia. By May 7, Unionists in Parkersburg, Virginia, were pleading with Dennison for troops to occupy the town; on the same day, the governor got McClellan's Department of the Ohio extended to include western Virginia. On the 10th, Dennison urged the general to take troops across the Ohio river to seize the western terminals of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. McClellan refused, objecting that such a move would be very dangerous, "particularly in view of the condition of the troops and the administrative branches." On May 20, Dennison's agents informed him that rebel troops were on the way to Wheeling. The governor, beginning to doubt McClellan's willingness to act, hurried the news to Secretary of War Cameron. Four days later, Cameron asked McClellan to "counteract" the effect of rebel troop movements in order to save western Virginia for the Union. McClellan, now ready to move, asked Dennison for Ohio militia—militia which, as it turned out, had not been mustered into federal service. Dennison willingly complied; and on May 26, McClellan invaded Virginia with soldiers in the pay of a state. He quickly secured the line of the Baltimore and Ohio and protected the Wheeling convention while it debated the future of western Virginia.³²

The federal government promised to adopt the Ohio troops used in western Virginia into United States service, muster them out on their return, and pay them. However, when the regiments did come home, they found no mustering officers, paymasters, muster-rolls, or money. The troops had to go home without pay, and 9,000 more discontented men were scattered about the state. The incident afforded another example of a problem beyond Dennison's control; difficulties which nevertheless told against him in his bid for renomination in 1861.³³

Ohio Republicans were anxiously anticipating the fall elections, and hoped to gain the support of prowar Democrats for a Union ticket. But in any such coalescing movement they would have to dump Dennison. Democrats could not be expected to vote for a man who had helped organize the Ohio Republican party, fought for repeal of the state's Black Laws, opposed the Fugitive Slave Act, and smothered compromise attempts. As convention time drew near, Democratic newspapers, led by Samuel Medary's *Columbus Crisis* and the *Cincinnati Enquirer*, effectively used Dennison's extra-legal dis-

position of federal funds, his inept handling of provisioning contracts, and the general disorder accompanying the raising of state troops to damn his administration. Still more significant opposition to Dennison's renomination came from within his own party. The "sucedaneum governor" had never been popular with rank and file Republicans; and as they watched him grope for solutions to the many problems that pressed on him after the firing on Fort Sumter, they quickly decided he was better fitted for running a bank than a state. Republican as well as Democratic newspapers raised an outcry at his arbitrary interference with ordinary telegraphic dispatches, thus turning an important element against his candidacy. Leading men in both parties joined in condemning the confused situation at Camp Dennison and blamed Dennison, not the federal government, for the delay in mustering out and paying the first three-month volunteers. While Democrats cried that his military appointments were partisan, Republicans were horrified to find that Dennison had managed to get three Democrats, and only one Republican, named to the four generalships assigned to the state.³⁴

As early as June 13, Sam Medary commented that Dennison's friends had withdrawn his name from the list of candidates and that the Republicans would name someone suitable to prowar Democrats. On August 7, the regular Democrats held their convention, nominated H. J. Jewett for governor, criticized state and national administrations, and recommended a national convention to settle difficulties and preserve the Union. The Republicans stalled while their coalition movement gathered strength, and then, on September 5, held a Union convention to nominate David Tod, an old Democratic wheelhorse, for governor. The delegates passed brief resolutions declaring the purpose of the war was solely to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and the preservation of the Union without condition or compromise. They managed to avoid giving Dennison a vote of confidence. In the ensuing election, Tod won easily with a 55,203 majority, and the Union party gained an overwhelming majority in both houses of the General Assembly.³⁵

On January 6, 1862, William Dennison delivered his last message to the state legislature; the address, even longer and wordier than usual, ranged over a wide variety of topics. He reviewed the growth of Ohio's resources, charted her financial condition, defended his unauthorized expenditure of federal money, and, as a state bank director, expressed extreme disapproval of Chase's national bank and currency schemes. Dennison made no mention of the new Union party's policy, but avowed personal belief that the war would eventual-

ly end slavery. However, still hoping that the Negroes could be colonized in Central America, he repeated his earlier reservations about immediate emancipation.

Thus ended the term of Ohio's first war governor. Many misfortunes during his administration stemmed from ineptitude, delay, and incompetence in the federal government's War Department; other mistakes arose from the inexperience of both governor and staff. Perhaps Dennison's chief fault was a failure to reorganize his administration immediately after Sumter. At any rate, by the end of 1861 the governor had solved most of his problems and had ended loose spending and mismanagement. Despite early doubts of his executive capacity, no one could question his vigor in securing western Virginia for the Union and demanding speedy action in Kentucky. In the midst of innumerable difficulties, he had raised 23 regiments for three months and 82 regiments for three years, totalling slightly over 100,000 men, an excess of 20,000 over the calls made upon the state. Although he had handled large sums of money without legal authority, Dennison had paid the state's debts, supplied her soldiers, and furnished the state auditor with an account of every penny spent. He had streamlined his staff and created county and district military committees, all of which greatly eased the path of his successor. No Ohio chief executive had ever exercised such powers and fulfilled such duties with a greater sense of public responsibility and determination. Nevertheless, the exigencies of politics dictated his demise; Republicans could win in 1861 only with a less radical candidate who had no connection with the outgoing administration. So Dennison paid the price of leading the state into the first year of war. The newly-elected governor, Tod, recognized Dennison's capacities and used his services frequently during his own administration. In 1864, Abraham Lincoln, who was also quite aware of the former chief executive's abilities, made Dennison his postmaster-general. Indeed, it was only after his governorship was over that William Dennison gained the popular approval Ohioans had denied him while he was in office.³⁷

DAVID TOD

In contrast to Dennison, whose parting message was prolix and involved, the new governor was sharp, almost curt, in his inaugural address. During the campaign in the summer of 1861, David Tod had refused to debate Democrat H. J. Jewett and had sought to create an impression that he was a direct, forceful administrator who would let his actions speak louder than his words. In his principal cam-

paigned speech he had taken a stark stand against compromise; and when he came to take his oath as governor, he was emphatic that the national government should be restored—and restored “irrespective of the influence this may have upon the domestic institutions of any of the states.” However, in the same breath Tod assured Southerners that the North sought only the maintenance of the Constitution, not the destruction of slavery. The war, said Tod in words that at once echoed Lincoln’s first message to Congress and anticipated by a score of months the brilliant formulation of the Gettysburg Address, was a test of man’s capacity for self-government. It was in Tod’s mind, a stern admonition to the legislature to measure up to its responsibilities. He was impatient with the solons’ slowness in passing measures for the welfare of the troops. He demanded immediately just and equal taxes. He wanted an austere reduction of salaries and expenses in the face of the demands of the war.³⁸

Governor Tod was blunt. His grim approach to his new duties and responsibilities seemed to mark a new man, utterly unlike the sociable, urbane, witty, and genial politician who had long been prominent in Democratic parleys. He had always given an appearance of frankness and honesty, even of firmness, but a tactful approach had hitherto characterized him. His last position of prominence before secession and civil war had been as chairman of the Baltimore Convention of the disrupted Democrats which had nominated Stephen A. Douglas. He was a Douglas man, but he tried manfully to heal the breach in his party. Conciliation, compromise, and genial tact had seemed to characterize him then and to be the essential features of his personality. These were the qualities which had recommended Tod to the “Union” Republican convention which nominated him.³⁹

David Tod’s political career, always as a faithful Democrat, had been long in Ohio politics. He was a native of Youngstown, a lawyer who had made a fortune from the coal and iron resources of the Mahoning Valley. He was, in fact, the founder of the Youngstown iron industry. He had promoted, and then become president of, the Cleveland and Mahoning Railroad. In politics, he had represented the business interests with which he was associated. In the state senate he was known as a hard-money man, but he had trimmed his views on banking and monetary policy to suit whatever faction controlled the party. He had opposed the extremists—the “loco-focos” and the abolitionists like Salmon P. Chase who would make the Democratic party into an agency of social reform. With John Brough in the state assembly, he had promoted a fugitive slave bill. He had helped

read Thomas Morris, an antislaveryite, out of the party. He had opposed the repeal of Ohio's black laws. Yet, under pressure, he had agreed Negroes should participate fully in the common school funds.⁴⁰

He was, withal, ambitious for political power. In 1844 and 1846, he had been an unsuccessful candidate for governor. From 1847 to 1852, he had been minister to Brazil. In 1863, Samuel Medary, Copperhead editor of the *Columbus Crisis*, who had been Tod's close associate in prewar Democratic politics, recalled that Tod had promised him the Brazilian post if Medary would edit the state party's newspaper during the 1846 gubernatorial campaign. Medary agreed; but when Tod lost the election, he took the ministerial position himself. Although Medary announced in January, 1862, that he would view Tod's administration "with leniency, if not with favor, especially as compared with the outgoing one," he soon began to criticize the new governor and his Union Democrat compatriots. Medary had never given his support to the war; Tod, who in early 1861 had warned Republicans not to coerce the South, after the firing on Sumter had promised Lincoln his full assistance. Thus, Medary and Tod went their separate ways.⁴¹

In his new role as a forceful, forthright, aggressive governor, David Tod faced his problems. Many were problems inherited from Dennison, and fortunately for him, frequently solutions had already been worked out under his predecessor. Tod inherited Dennison's staff, which now consisted of men of competence and experience, and he continued to use the former governor's military committees. By taking advantage of Dennison's experiences, Tod was able to avoid some of the mistakes which had proved disastrous to his predecessor.⁴²

But Tod's administration brought a host of new difficulties. The national government demanded more, ever more, new troops—taxing the capacity of the people and the ingenuity of the governor. Tod had troubles with Washington, troubles with his own people, troubles with his legislature, and he faced invasion and the threat of invasion of the state over which he presided. Neither his appearance of forcefulness, nor the genial personality of a politician were to spare him from a fate not unlike Dennison's.

Tod's accession to office coincided with Lincoln's appointment of bewhiskered Edwin M. Stanton to replace Cameron as Secretary of War. Stanton was another of Tod's prewar Democratic associates, and it appeared that relations between the Ohio chief executive and Washington would be cordial. Shortly after his inauguration, Tod sent a query to Stanton which indicated that, despite the experiences

of nine months of war, relationships between state and federal governments regarding the raising and control of troop were still not clear. Tod wanted to know what were his duties in procuring supplies, what control he had over state troops after they were sworn into federal service, whether the federal government would refund all money Ohio expended on her troops, and what control he as governor had over military prisoners in the state. Fortunately, Tod's duties in raising soldiers during the first few months of his administration were light; he merely filled regiments then in camp. On April 3, Stanton actually discontinued recruiting, although in late May he had to appeal for temporary troops to defend Washington from Stonewall Jackson's forays in the Shenandoah valley. By the time Tod had raised 5,000 men at Camp Chase to send on to the national capital, the Confederate threat had subsided; but Stanton praised Tod's "stirring appeal" to Ohioans for aid in the crisis and urged that he continue to recruit three-year volunteers.⁴³

Tod's respite from the burdens of meeting troop calls was brief. In late June came McClellan's defeat before Richmond, forcing Lincoln to ask for more troops. Fearing he might cause a panic by appealing publicly for volunteers, Lincoln proposed that the governors demand a call for 150,000 men. The governors grudgingly agreed; Tod complained to Stanton that the five regiments he was currently organizing were "in the absence of disastrous news from Richmond, all that Ohio can readily raise." When Lincoln issued his call, he doubled the number he had induced the governors to request, yet he told them that "I should not want half of 300,000 new troops if I could have them now." The state executives soon reported that recruiting was slow; they demanded a bounty, and some suggested a draft. Lincoln was not long in answering; on August 4, under the authorization of a militia draft act passed by Congress, he called on the governors for 300,000 militia to serve for nine months and asked the governors to draft militia to fill any gaps in the earlier call for three-year volunteers. The governors were to begin drafting on August 15, a date that was rapidly approaching. Since Stanton let one three-year volunteer equal four nine-month militiamen, the governors were able to meet the combined calls, but the draft and new levies nevertheless presented Tod and his harrassed fellow executives with heavy burdens.⁴⁴

Ohio's quota under the calls totalled about 74,000; Tod had already ordered an enrollment of the militia preparatory to any eventual draft, and at the same time cast about for ways to encourage volunteering in order that the state might avoid conscription. He pressed

advice upon Stanton, urging that the Secretary allow men to come home from the front to recruit companies in return for a commission. The recommendation irritated men remaining in the field and led to the only serious difficulties Tod had with officers at the front—many of whom refused to recognize commissions he had given for recruiting. Tod himself realized that in his efforts to popularize enlistment he had appointed some incompetent officers, and he asked Stanton to set up an examining board in Kentucky to eliminate some of them. He also got a requisition from Stanton for \$1,000 to employ speakers in efforts to encourage enlistment.⁴⁵

Despite all of Tod's efforts, recruiting was slow; and it was apparent the state would have to draft militia. Even before the date set for the August draft, Tod's mail was filled with requests for exemption. The governor took it upon himself to exempt state and county officials and as a railroad man, fruitlessly pleaded for the exception of railroad employees. Also without authority, he allowed conscientious objectors to pay a commutation fee of \$200 to avoid service. Twice, in an effort to avoid it entirely, Tod got the draft postponed. However, on October 1, he had to order a draft of 12,251 to complete the state quota. Of that number, 2000 were discharged for various causes, 4800 enlisted for three years, 2400 were conscripted, and the balance failed to respond. Subsequent enlistments more than made up the deficiencies in the draft.⁴⁶

Tod continued to besiege Stanton with appeals for assistance and suggestions on recruiting methods. His frequent correspondence with the War Department led even dynamic Governor Andrew of Massachusetts to wish that he might "perhaps be allowed—as Tod—in my letters to Mr. Stanton to make a humble *suggestion*, sometimes." The Ohio governor pleaded with Stanton to supply him with mustering officers and pay for regiments that had completed their terms of service; he also complained that he had over 20,000 men in camp with no blankets or clothing. Displaying a questionable acquaintance with the Bible, he thundered: "I know not where the fault is, and it is well that I do not, for I would whip the fellow ere he was as strong as Methuselah."⁴⁷

In September Tod took time off from the arduous labors of raising troops to journey to Altoona, Pennsylvania for a meeting with the governors of the loyal states. John Andrew and other New England governors planned to raise Negro troops in order to avoid drafting their citizens. Radical Republicans, anxious for a war to end slavery and destroy Southern political and economic power, planned to force their program on the President, while moderates like Tod and Penn-

sylvania's Governor Andrew G. Curtin hoped the conference would uphold administration policy. On September 23, the day before the governors met, Lincoln issued a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, cutting the ground from under the radicals. The next day, when Andrew demanded General McClellan's removal and offered resolutions hailing the Emancipation Proclamation, Tod declared the people of Ohio would rise up and repudiate such treatment of the army commander. He then successfully substituted more conservative resolutions on emancipation. Both Dennison and Tod had previously defended McClellan from radical criticism, and Tod had asked Stanton to "for God's sake stop the wrangling between the friends of McClellan and yourself in Congress. I ask this as the friend of both." Such action might have gained Tod McClellan's gratitude, but it cost him valuable support among radicals in Ohio.⁴⁸

The Emancipation Proclamation capped a series of developments tending to disrupt the Union Republican organization and add strength to the Democratic party in Ohio as well as elsewhere. As the fall elections came near in the Buckeye state, Republicans had to cope with widespread discouragement at the failure of McClellan's Peninsular Campaign and the defeat at Second Manassas. Radical Republicans chafed angrily at Lincoln's removal of abolitionist General Fremont, while conservatives were equally alarmed at Congressional confiscation acts and the use of Negroes to suppress the rebellion. Democrats also benefited from popular reaction to the arrest of several Democratic newspaper editors in Ohio. The Emancipation Proclamation turned many more conservatives away from the Union party. Consequently the Democratic candidates, running on a platform of "Union as it has been and the Constitution as it is," carried their state ticket by a majority of 5,577 and won fourteen of nineteen Congressional districts. However, Clement Vallandigham of Dayton, leading Copperhead Congressman, failed in his bid for re-election after Republicans gerrymandered his district.⁴⁹

On January 5, 1863, in his annual message to the legislature, Tod made no reference to confiscation or the Emancipation Proclamation, but instead spoke only of the need of maintaining the war effort. Believing the President and the administration had acted correctly to restore peace and harmony, Tod admitted he had acquiesced in orders for military arrests and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Ohio. The question of man's capacity for self-government, which he had raised in his inaugural, Tod found yet unanswered. In order for Ohio to aid more fully in settling that issue, he asked the legislature for better provisions for soldiers' families, a more efficient militia

organization, and support for a military school. Tod ended by suggesting the Union party could avoid another defeat at the polls by enacting legislation to allow soldiers in the field to vote. Stanton found Tod's message "manly and patriotic," while Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, termed it "wholesome and vigorous."⁵⁰

As the new year progressed, Tod's relations with his legislature became more and more strained; the governor was often impatient and even dictatorial with the solons, who resented his peremptory demands for legislation. Democrats and conservative Unionists were angry with the military arrests he had sanctioned in the state, while radical legislators were unhappy about his failure to support emancipation. They also complained that Tod allowed rebel officers in Columbus prison camps to have the run of the city, while he refused to release Negro prisoners taken after the Fort Donelson campaign. Republicans protested that Tod's appointment policy gave almost all the important offices in the state either to Democrats or Democratic Unionists. When the Republican state auditor moved up into a Treasury Department position, Tod ignored a legislative petition and gave the vacated post to a Democrat who had headed the defeated Union ticket in 1862. Promptly Secretary Chase joined Republican state legislators in complaints. In the General Assembly, Tod's proposal for a reorganization of the militia met much partisan opposition, and only in the last hours of the session was the bill passed. Although the measure came too late to help Tod much in organizing the state to repel Confederate cavalry raids, it did enable his successor, John Brough, at a critical moment to raise hurriedly 40,000 National Guards to send to Washington.⁵¹

Tod's troubles with the legislature were only a part of the difficulties he faced as his second year began. By November, 1862, the governor had been able to fill all of Ohio's troop quotas, but he had reached the limit of his ability to enlist volunteers. On the first day of February, 1863, he wrote Stanton to inform him that if the government wanted more troops, the Secretary would have to produce a uniform system of drafting: "With this Ohio will respond to any further calls made upon her, but without it it would be impossible to raise any considerable number." Tod was not alone in his opinion: in March, Republican congressmen passed a national Enrollment Act, which for the first time asserted the power of the federal government to raise troops without state assistance. Under the law, the federal government created enrollment districts in the states and appointed provost marshals to enroll men, assign quotas, and offer exemptions. The

enrollment proceeded immediately as the provost-marshal general began drafting in states deficient under previous calls.⁵²

Although Ohio was excluded from the first draft, on June 15, Tod got an urgent request from Washington for 30,000 militia to protect eastern Ohio and western Pennsylvania and Virginia from rebel attack—Lee was launching a new invasion of the North. The Ohio governor issued a proclamation exhorting his constituents: "To the rescue then at once, and thus save all that is dear to man." At the same time, he asked Stanton if the militia thus busily saving "all that is dear to man" might be exempt from a possible draft; Stanton said no. Tod also complained to Stanton that another draft was scheduled to begin almost at the same time as Ohio's fall elections; Stanton agreed the "evil is so obvious" that the draft would be postponed. The governor, operating on the information from the Secretary, went a step farther than the facts warranted in informing Ohioans that there would be no draft in the state. Fortunately, his prediction came true when an examination of the statistics proved that Ohio had filled its quota. However, on October 17, Lincoln called for another 300,000 men, with a draft to follow in January if the states did not meet the call. The federal government was using the draft only to force governors to redouble their efforts to enlist volunteers.⁵³

Although Tod himself had suggested a uniform draft system, he was still anxious to avoid conscription if possible. He continued to urge the federal government to offer generous bounties and to let men at the front come home to recruit in return for a commission. In September, the provost-marshal general assented to his request and instructed commanding generals to send men to Ohio for recruiting duty. But, however anxious Tod was to fill state quotas by volunteering, he was hesitant to accept the services of Negro troops. During the first two years of the war, both he and Dennison had refused to use Negroes petitioning to assist in the war effort. Tod pleaded that the law did not permit him to accept the military services of colored men. Even after January, 1863, when Lincoln authorized the raising of Negro regiments, Tod refused to enlist any colored troops, and let Andrew of Massachusetts organize Negroes in Ohio. He did make sure that his state would receive credit on its own quotas for the colored troops Andrew raised. Finally, in June, when Andrew refused to take more colored troops and it seemed clear that Ohio was not getting full credit for all Negroes enlisted within her borders, Tod agreed to raise a colored regiment of his own. Since the law providing relief of soldiers' families did not apply to Negroes, Tod

appointed a committee including ex-Governor Dennison to raise voluntary subscriptions for that purpose.⁵⁴

While Tod busily raised troops for service in the federal armies outside the state, he also had to maintain defenses at home. Dennison's actions and Union troop movements had already relieved any immediate threat of invasion from below the Ohio River, but Tod lived in constant fear of cavalry raids up through Kentucky or western Virginia. In June, 1862, he suggested that Stanton provide an organized force in Ohio for defensive purposes in case the Confederates came through the Cumberland Gap or up the Kanawha river. He also wanted a strong Union force in Kentucky.⁵⁵

In the early summer of 1862, in spite of Tod's concern for the state's safety, most Ohioans felt secure—Confederate General P. G. T. Beauregard had evacuated Corinth; Memphis had fallen; Buell was moving toward Chattanooga; and Kentucky, under the supervision of a state military board, was raising volunteers for the Union army. Suddenly, on July 11, a news dispatch from Kentucky dispelled the calm—the Confederate raider John Morgan was storming through the Bluegrass, reportedly heading for Lexington. Cincinnatians, fearing Morgan was on his way to their city, milled anxiously in the streets, listening to varying reports about the size, speed, and destination of the Confederate force. Tod quickly sent the only troops he could find—convalescents from Camps Dennison and Chase—to reinforce the frightened city. He also asked former Governor Dennison to visit Cincinnati and to consult with Ohio troops that had hastily gathered in Frankfort, Kentucky. Despite the excitement and frantic activity, Morgan never threatened Cincinnati, and the crisis soon passed. But Tod had received proof that his fears about Ohio's southern border were not groundless.⁵⁶

On July 30, Tod had an interview with Judge Richard A. Buckner, of Kentucky, and a committee of "highly respectable gentlemen" from Cincinnati, who told him they feared a raid on the Kentucky legislature when it assembled the next week. Tod thereupon asked Stanton to send several three-month regiments to Frankfort and hurried the committee on to Washington to consult further with the Secretary. Tod warned the governors of Illinois and Indiana of the danger and detailed the steps he had taken to meet it. He assured Yates in Illinois that Lincoln and Stanton had promised to raise troops in Kentucky and put gunboats on the Ohio River. Once again, however, the threat failed to materialize.⁵⁷

The months of July and August were comparatively quiet along the border; but just at the end of the latter month, Kentucky again

erupted as Confederate General Kirby Smith, followed by Morgan, led 12,000 men straight into the heart of the state. On the first of September, Smith triumphantly entered Lexington; two days later, he dispatched several thousand men toward Covington and Cincinnati. News of the invasion reached Cincinnati the night of August 30; but this time no panic ensued, as citizens discounted the threat. However, when Cincinnatians learned that Union troops were falling back on Louisville, leaving nothing but the Ohio River between their city and Smith's cavalry, they began to take alarm. As the City Council hurriedly sought to organize Cincinnati's defenses, General H. G. Wright, commander of the Department of the Ohio, ordered General Lew Wallace to the Queen City to assume command and defend the town. Immediately upon his arrival, before most citizens knew exactly what was happening, Wallace declared martial law, suspended all business, and stopped ferryboats, in spite of the warning from one of his friends that "if the enemy should not come after all this fuss you will be ruined."⁵⁸

While Wallace was busy issuing proclamations, forming military organizations, and throwing up breastworks across the Ohio River, Governor Tod hurried down to examine the situation for himself. He telegraphed his adjutant-general to forward all available troops and sent out warnings to communities along the border, declaring that "the soil of Ohio must not be invaded by the enemies of our glorious Government." Tod found great confusion in Cincinnati, and was unable to learn of the whereabouts of the enemy. Nevertheless, he issued a proclamation the night of September 2, announcing that he would accept all armed companies and squads of men who wished to defend the city. Before daybreak on the 3rd, the "Squirrel Hunters," as the hastily-organized irregulars became known, were filing through the streets. In the meantime, Tod sought to secure border defenses elsewhere. Summoning all his epistolary talents in an attempt to bolster the morale of a worried captain in Gallipolis, he urged him to "stand firm and show your blood. Should you fall I will escort your remains home."⁵⁹

Several days passed and no enemy appeared. Cincinnati was jammed to overflowing with "Squirrel Hunters," and some of them, aggrieved because Wallace had shut down the beer parlors but not the street cars, began tearing up railroad tracks. Cincinnati businessmen complained at the continuance of martial law and protested that the people could get neither bread nor medicine while all the shops were closed. General Wright finally removed Wallace from command, sent him across the Ohio River to superintend defenses there, and reopened

the city's businesses. He asked Tod to stem the flow of armed men into Cincinnati; the governor issued another proclamation, praising Ohioans for their "noble and generous response," but adding that no more volunteers were needed. After a few more false alarms, on September 13, Tod announced the safety of Cincinnati and sent the volunteers home at state expense. In May, 1863, nine months after the Kirby Smith raid, when the question of Tod's renomination came up, the governor conveniently recalled his Squirrel Hunters and issued to each and every one of them a "beautiful lithographic discharge" with his picture engraved on the back.⁶⁰

Not until July, 1863, were Tod's worst fears regarding Confederate invasion realized: in that month, Morgan again entered Kentucky, and this time he did not stop until he reached Ohio soil. Despite the experiences of the preceding summer, danger of invasion again threw Ohio into great confusion. Morgan, with 3,000 horsemen, reached the Ohio River on July 8, crossed the stream to enter Indiana, and then turned northeast toward Cincinnati. On July 12, Tod, announcing the state was in imminent danger of invasion, called out militia companies in the southern counties. The next day, while rural communities were reading Tod's appeal for troops, Morgan was moving through the suburbs of Cincinnati, clashing only once with pickets at Camp Dennison. Residents of southern Ohio, panic-stricken and confused by contradictory reports of Morgan's movements, frantically hid their silver spoons and drove their stock into the woods. One housewife protected the family carriage-horse by stabling it in the parlor. Militia troops poured into the countryside in hot pursuit of the Confederate raider; in all, over 50,000 Ohioans took the field against Morgan, and not half of them ever got within 60 miles of their quarry.

On July 19, Ohio militia and Union cavalry trapped Morgan at the Ohio River and captured most of his force. Morgan and a few hundred men got away, and for a week evaded their pursuers. Tod, frantic at the failure to find the elusive Confederate, hastily wrote a militia officer at Cleveland that "Morgan may yet reach the lake shore!" On July 26, Morgan finally fell into the hands of Union troops, who put him in a penitentiary in Columbus. Four months later, he escaped and fled the state, leaving behind him a rattled executive facing claims for over \$600,000 in damages as a consequence of the raid. Tod, adding the expense of putting the militia into the field, estimated that Morgan cost the State of Ohio over one million dollars. After the scare was over, Democratic newspapers and even some Republican sheets criticized Tod for calling out too many men,

forcing them to leave their farms and workbenches to mill fruitlessly in the fields; Sam Medary termed the whole episode "Tod's Military Elephant."⁶¹

Tod also worried about the security of the various military prisons in Ohio; particularly, he thought that the Johnson's Island camp, situated in Lake Erie just north of Sandusky, was susceptible to Confederate attack from Canada. In the early summer of 1862, he asked Stanton for troops to strengthen the garrison there and also suggested that Welles send a naval steamer to the vicinity. Again in October, 1863, Tod asked Stanton to increase the guard on the island, and he obtained a revenue steamer to aid in guarding the prisoners. When, in November, Stanton informed the governors of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and New York that Confederates were plotting to raid Buffalo and Johnson's Island, Tod sent 500 troops from Cleveland and gathered volunteer militia at strategic points along the lake shore. Confederates actually attempted to seize a ship and cross Lake Erie in order to free rebel prisoners, but were quickly apprehended, ending the threat to Ohio's northern border.⁶²

Not all the dangers that Tod worried about were external: within the state, the governor battled with recalcitrant Democrats, unruly newspaper editors, draft rioters, and strange secret societies. As he struggled to raise troops to meet the various calls from the federal government, Tod grew angry with antiwar Democrats whom he charged with discouraging enlistments. During the summer of 1862, under the authority of the President's proclamation suspending the writ of habeas corpus, federal authorities arrested eleven Ohioans for seeking to subvert the war effort. They made two arrests at the direct request of Governor Tod. Democrats condemned the action as arbitrary, unconstitutional, and unwarranted; Tod answered that the men had committed treason by interfering with the defense of the federal government. In early 1863, a select committee of the General Assembly—controlled by Republicans—investigated the arrests and found that they were indeed necessary to the safety of the government.⁶³

The first man arrested on Tod's recommendation was Edson B. Olds, a leading peace Democrat from Lancaster. On July 29, 1862, Tod warned Secretary of State Seward that Olds was a "shrewd, cunning man, with capacity for great mischief, and should at once be put out of the way." On August 12, Federal authorities imprisoned Olds and followed up the arrest with several others. Tod threatened Democratic newspaper editors who loudly protested Olds' imprisonment. Several witnesses asserted the governor had warned

the editor of the *Ohio Eagle* that "I am to be the judge of what you may and may not say, constitutions and laws notwithstanding." The Olds case quickly became a *cause célèbre* for the Democratic press, which got further editorial material after March, 1863, when the much-discussed prisoner was released. Olds obtained a warrant for Tod's arrest on a kidnapping charge. He and John W. Kees, another victim of Tod's arbitrary actions, also filed suits against the governor for a total of \$130,000 in damages. When Tod was arrested on the kidnapping charge, the state Supreme Court immediately granted him a writ of habeas corpus—which had been denied to Olds the year before. The case dragged on for several months before it was finally dropped, along with the damage suits.⁶⁴

To Tod, such Democratic editors and politicians were only part of a greater conspiracy to destroy the Union War effort. Correspondents throughout the state kept him informed of "disloyal organizations" with secret signs and oaths which busily plotted against the government. On February 23, 1863, Tod met in Cincinnati with Indiana's Governor Morton, ex-Governors Dennison and Joseph A. Wright, of Indiana, General Lew Wallace, and other military officers. The various dignitaries spoke to a Union mass meeting held at the city opera house. Tod assured his listeners that he spoke for the Democratic party—the party of Jackson, not the "bastard Democratic party" that opposed the war. He defended the Olds arrest, and attacked southern sympathizers who refused to volunteer and discouraged the enlistment of others. Lew Wallace then rose and warned of terrible dangers threatening Ohio—dangers that came not from rebel camps but from within the state itself. The General had detected a "widespread and insidious conspiracy" of 80,000 Ohioans, who were dedicated either to stopping the war or promoting a western confederacy. In order to defeat the plans of these insurrectionaries, Wallace advised loyal citizens to "organize not politically, but in the style of soldiers."⁶⁵

Though Wallace could find little proof of such a widespread conspiracy to pull the Northwest out of the Union, there was plenty of evidence that many citizens objected to being drafted into the federal armies. The governors of Indiana, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania encountered resistance in 1862 as they applied the militia draft; and in the following year, more serious disturbances broke out in New York and Ohio. In June, as drafting began in Ohio under the national conscription act, Tod applied for Stanton for troops to "guarantee the peace and quiet of the state." He stationed guards at an-

anticipated trouble spots in an effort to avoid any wide-spread resistance to enrollment and drafting.⁶⁶

In spite of Tod's precautions, by the middle of June Ohio's assistant provost-marshal general reported armed resistance to the draft in at least four counties. The most serious disturbances occurred in Holmes County, where irate citizens attacked an enrollment officer and freed several men federal officials had arrested. Colonel William Wallace, commander of United States forces in Ohio, who was ordered to the scene, expected to find the malcontents armed with cannon and in a fortified camp. Tod, hoping to avoid bloodshed, issued a proclamation calling on the draft resisters to disperse; if they didn't, the governor warned of consequences "destructive in the extreme." He asked Wallace to present this proclamation under a flag of truce; if the rioters refused to disband, Wallace was to "show them no quarter whatever." The colonel, commanding a force of 230 men hastily gathered from several nearby army camps, found the rioters huddled behind some rocks. His force easily scattered the opposition, killing two and wounding several. The next day the insurgents agreed to surrender the men who had attacked the enrollment officer, and peace returned to Holmes County. In July, Tod again indicated his willingness to shed blood if necessary to conduct enrollments; he told the mayor of Cleveland that if rioters interfered with drafting in his city, guards should use no blank cartridges.⁶⁷

Despite Tod's activities in raising troops, fending off invasion, and quelling riots, he did not forget that 1863 was an election year. In early May, he told a Union gathering at Mahoning that he would "consent to be a candidate for another term." He also attacked peace Democrats and defended the actions of the Lincoln administration. During the speech, which the *Mahoning Sentinel* labelled as the "Opening 'Bawl' of the Abolition Campaign," the governor reminded his listeners of his immense labors during the past year. He modestly confessed that "ministering comfort and consolation to the friends, the widows, mothers and sisters of my gallant boys has occupied much of my time."⁶⁸

Tod was telling the truth; from the first days of his administration, the governor had outdone himself in efforts to provide for his constituents serving in the Union armies. In April, 1862, after the battle of Shiloh, Tod sent a hospital ship to the scene and sought to remove wounded Ohio soldiers to hospitals at Cincinnati. He asked the Ohio assembly for "extraordinary power and discretion" in order to appoint additional surgeons, nurses, and agents for Ohio regiments in the field, and wanted permission to employ such transportation as

was necessary to get the wounded into Ohio hospitals. He sent special agents to Washington, Louisville, Cincinnati, and New York to aid disabled soldiers in obtaining their back pay, bounties, and pensions. He established several other agencies both within and outside the state to care for sick, disabled, and straggling Ohio soldiers. In June, Tod sent a special messenger to confer with the Medical Department of the Army about getting some reimbursement from the federal government for expenses incurred in removing sick and wounded soldiers in the Tennessee and Cumberland valleys. Tod also wanted to know why the federal government refused to recognize the fifty state surgeons he had appointed to serve in Ohio regiments. Once again he called on former Governor Dennison, sending him to visit Ohio troops in Cincinnati and Kentucky to see that they were well equipped and healthy. By the end of the year, Tod estimated that he had spent a total of \$127,071 for removing sick and wounded from battlefields, for assistant surgeons, and for sanitary agents and supplies. Tod hopefully charged the expenses to the federal government.⁶⁹

In 1863, the battles of Stone's River, Vicksburg, and Gettysburg kept Tod busy sending more boats—which the federal government now refused to use—surgeons, nurses, and agents to ease the suffering of the wounded. He tried to get paroled Ohio prisoners and hospital patients removed to their home state as soon as possible, and several times demanded that Washington authorities remove incompetent directors in federal hospitals. He extended the system of state agencies to Nashville, Memphis, Keokuk, Harper's Ferry, Cairo, St. Louis, and Madison, Iowa. By the end of his term of office, Tod had indeed won the title of "the soldier's friend."⁷⁰

As the 1863 state campaign moved closer, Ohioans gave more and more attention to politics. Both Ohio and Pennsylvania had gubernatorial elections in October, and the results of the contests would prove crucial to the Republican party. If the Democrats could carry both states in the fall, they might well elect a President the following year. Thus, the selection of gubernatorial candidates was very important for both parties.

Ohio Democrats, exuberant after their victory in the 1862 elections, had become bolder in their attacks on both the state and federal administrations. Their acknowledged leader, ex-Congressman Clement L. Vallandigham, took the stump early in March to denounce war and conscription. Though not all Democrats agreed with him on the need for peace, they could unite in opposition to an abolitionist war and in defense of constitutional liberties. However, Vallandigham's speech-

es proved too extreme for General Ambrose E. Burnside, commander of the Department of the Ohio. In May, the General's men arrested Vallandigham and tried him before a military court martial. The military court, in turn, sentenced him to prison for attempting to hinder the prosecution of the war. Burnside's action ensured Vallandigham's nomination by the Democrats; on June 11, they named him and George Pugh to head their ticket. The platform proved more conservative than the candidates; the Democrats sought only their rights under the Constitution, recognized their allegiance to the government, and protested emancipation and martial law. The convention refused to declare in favor of an immediate end to the war or for separation of the warring sections.⁷¹

A week later, Republicans met at Columbus to select their candidates. Just as his predecessor, Dennison, had failed to satisfy important elements in his party, so David Tod had managed to antagonize many influential factions within the Republican "Union" organization. Through his role in making military arrests, he had alarmed conservative Unionists; on the other hand, Tod had embittered Ohio radicals by appointing Democrats to several state offices and by refusing to defend the Emancipation Proclamation. Ohio's Union Leagues, dominated by radicals, refused to support him. In addition, Democrats smeared Tod for his role in the sale of a canal company—in which the state had invested heavily—to the Mahoning railroad. Democratic sleuths found that Tod was president of both the canal and the railroad, thus benefitting from the sale at public expense.⁷²

More important, railroad issues were considered in addition to the questions of abolition, canals, and military arrests. Governor Tod, a railroad president, had no interest in a current scheme for consolidating railroad lines from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi. The roads that sought the consolidation found a champion in the president of another line, John Brough, an old Ohio Democrat who had been living in Indiana for several years. The two leading Republican newspapers of Cincinnati, the *Gazette* and the *Commercial*, united in putting Brough's name before the Republican convention. Here was the answer for Republican politicians seeking a man on whom all factions of the party could unite. During the war, Brough had been out of the state; he had not expressed his views on any of the significant issues of the day and, consequently, had antagonized no one. Republican masterminds hoped Brough's long-time Democratic affiliation would strengthen the "Unionist" appeal of their party. Consequently, Brough edged Tod for the nomination in a close vote, 216 to 193.

Two years before, Dennison had paid the price for failing to satisfy the various interests and factions of his party; now Tod suffered the same fate. Just as he had replaced his predecessor at the dictation of political expediency, now Tod in turn had lost his job for similar reasons.⁷³

The governor, angry with the results of the convention, wired Lincoln that "personal considerations alone were the cause of my defeat." Lincoln regretted Tod had not been nominated, but said he had nothing against Brough. "On the contrary, like yourself, I say hurrah for him." Tod assured the President that he would do all in his power to secure Brough's election. He also continued to work diligently to serve out the rest of his term.⁷⁴

In Tod's final message to the legislature, delivered on January 4, 1864, he reviewed the past year, finding that the state government had cared for Ohio's wounded soldiers, repelled border raids, and given conclusive evidence of a determination to uphold the national government. Reminding the legislators that Ohio now had a total of 200,671 troops in the field, he asked them to increase the tax levy for the support of soldiers' families. Tod also hoped the solons would grant his successor an increase in salary.⁷⁵

Tod was in ill health as he closed out his administration. Governing the state of Ohio through two years of war had worn him out; he had worked hard to fulfill the obligations of his office. Although he, as Brough, had been selected more for his political qualifications than for executive ability, Tod had demonstrated considerable capability in meeting the problems of raising and providing for state troops. He had dutifully served the cause of the Lincoln administration, a fact that the President recognized. In June, 1864, Secretary of the Treasury Chase resigned and Lincoln turned to the former governor to fill the post. When Lincoln's secretary, John Hay, asked the President why he had selected Tod, Lincoln replied that "he is my friend, with a big head full of brains he made a good governor, and has made a fortune for himself." However, radical opposition to Tod's conservatism on slavery, plus doubts of his qualifications for the post, made it clear the Senate would never accept the nomination. Lincoln refused to withdraw Tod's name, and the ex-governor himself, pleading ill health, solved the problem by declining the position. During the remainder of the war, Tod, along with Dennison, continued to give his support to the Union party in Ohio.⁷⁶

JOHN BROUGH

The Union party's new gubernatorial candidate, John Brough, of Marietta, had been prominent in Democratic circles before the war. However, since 1844, when he had turned to devote his entire energies to running railroads, he had been inactive in politics. After he became president of the Madison and Indianapolis railroad, he moved to Indiana. In 1860, Brough had opposed Lincoln's election; but after the outset of war, he had refused to join in attacks on the administration. In 1863, when the anti-Tod forces in Ohio decided to nominate Brough, they brought him back to his home town, where, on June 10, he delivered a strong speech in behalf of the Union cause. Brough declared that, like a soldier, it was his duty to obey the President. He admitted he had not approved the Emancipation Proclamation, but he thought slavery was bound to perish in the war. Brough also justified confiscation and military arrests and appealed to patriots of all parties to unite against the Southern insurgents. Brough's backers made sure his fiery speech was widely circulated; within a week, they had gained him the Unionist party's nomination.⁷⁷

The fifty-three-year-old politician-turned-railroader had a reputation for rough and ready politics with a temperament to match. Brough's heavy, corpulent body and loose attire seemed to indicate a lack of vigor and determination, but this was belied by his stern face and firm mouth. A blunt, outspoken, rude man who loved to chew tobacco, he presented quite a contrast to his two handsome and dignified predecessors, Dennison and Tod. Unlike them, Brough had had to struggle to make a name for himself in Ohio; he had risen to party prominence and railroad presidencies only after making many enemies.

Orphaned in 1821 at the age of eleven, Brough had become a printer's apprentice, and in ten years was publishing his own newspapers, first in Marietta and then in Lancaster. A strongly partisan Jackson Democrat, Brough wrote sarcastic editorials that spared no one. In 1837, Brough won a seat in the Ohio House of Representatives, where he promoted fugitive slave bills, attacked abolitionists, and supported Ohio's black laws. Although he was only 26, he became chairman of the house committee on banks and currency; his efforts there to reform state currency and apply strict limits to banking activity won for him, despite the opposition of Sam Medary, the post of state auditor. Brough held the job for six years, and busily uncovered tax loopholes and school fund defalcations, fought debt repudiation, and sought to improve the whole state taxation system. In 1841, he and his brother bought a Cincinnati paper, renamed it

The Enquirer, and used it to increase Brough's political renown. In its columns Brough attacked Whigs and even Democrats who refused to support his bank policy. During the early 1840's Brough's many enemies abused him maliciously, and he never apologized for the keenness of his sarcasm in responding. When the editor of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, describing Brough's immensity, wrote,

If flesh is grass as people say
Then Johnny Brough's a load of hay

the harrassed auditor responded that he supposed he was hay, "judging from the number of asses that were nibbling at him."⁷⁸

In 1844, Whigs took over the state administration and Brough turned to forwarding his railroad career: in 1848, he became president of the Madison and Indianapolis railroad, then of the Bellefontaine line, and finally became head of the Indianapolis, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland railway. During the 1850's he busily promoted an Illinois road that would connect his lines with the Mississippi. Abraham Lincoln lobbied against his project. After the war started, Democratic papers, and even George B. Wright, Dennison's quarter-master general, accused Brough of refusing to transport sick and wounded Ohio soldiers for half-fare. In 1863, Brough accepted the nomination only after a friend volunteered to take over his duties as railroad president and allow Brough the salary.⁷⁹

The Unionist Republicans had picked a good candidate. Brough was an excellent stump speaker, a quality hitherto lacking in the party's gubernatorial nominees. Although Brough seemed to many to be hard-hearted and ill-natured, voters were attracted by his lack of pretense, wide experience, and reputation for honesty. For Ohioans who supported the war effort and feared Copperhead plots, Brough's outspokenness seemed to be just what was needed to defeat Clement Vallandigham. Although he had added flesh with years, Brough was still the fiery politician of old, and he soon warmed to the excitement of the campaign. On July 8, in a stormy speech in Cleveland, he thundered, "Either slavery must be torn out root and branch, or our Government will exist no longer." In September, Brough asserted Vallandigham's election "would be an invitation to the rebels in arms to come up and take possession of our soil." On the capitol steps in Columbus, he told an audience that loyal Ohioans would go to war rather than accept Vallandigham as their governor. Brough's vigorous campaigning was supplemented by the work of Tod, Senators Sherman and Wade, and Governors Morton, of Indiana, and Yates,

of Illinois, while Democrats imported Daniel W. Voorhees and Thomas A. Hendricks from Indiana. Despite the intensity of the canvass mobs rioted only once, wrecking Samuel Medary's newspaper office.⁸⁰

Although Republicans, including President Abraham Lincoln, were enormously concerned about the results of the Ohio election, the outcome was never in doubt. The peace issue weakened the Democratic party, and Unionist candidates benefited from optimism generated by federal victories in the East and the opening of the Mississippi in the West. Republicans organized "Strong Bands" and Union Leagues to combat alleged secret Democratic organizations and to stir enthusiasm for their candidate. The Ohio legislature had taken Tod's advice and had drawn up legislation permitting Ohio soldiers in the field to vote; when their returns came in, Brough received over 41,000 votes to Vallandigham's 2,388. President Lincoln authorized a fifteen-day leave for Ohio clerks in Washington to enable them to go home to vote; Secretary Chase, who had not been in Ohio since the war began, led the migration. Brough, benefitting from this assistance and from the largest vote in Ohio's history dealt a shattering blow to Copperheadism, burying Vallandigham by over 100,000 votes. Lincoln, who confessed to Gideon Welles that he had been more concerned over the Ohio election than his own in 1860, stayed up all night to get the results; early on October 14, Tod notified him that Brough's majority would be over 30,000, and at 5 a.m. Brough himself reported that he would win by over 100,000. Lincoln wired joyously in return: "Glory to God in the Highest, Ohio has saved the nation."⁸¹

The victorious candidate delivered his inaugural address on January 11, 1864. He told the assembled legislators that the election represented a "spontaneous declaration of the intense loyalty of our people to their government." Brough, seeing the end of the rebellion rapidly approaching, declared, "As we have not provoked this war, but sought rather to avoid it, we are not responsible for its consequences." He warned against negotiating with rebels in arms and demanded that fighting continue until the Southerners had surrendered unconditionally. Subjugation of the South, he felt, was the only certain means of success. Looking ahead to the problems of reconstruction, Brough asserted that when the war was over, loyal citizens of the South would emerge in enough numbers to trust them with the restored state governments.⁸²

The new governor soon found himself in the swirl of problems and pressures that had faced his predecessors: he had to continue raising troops, wrestle with the federal draft, provide for Ohio's

soldiers in the field, stand guard against secret societies, and protect his own political interests.

In late April, in one of his first important actions in an official capacity, Brough, together with the governors of Illinois, Indiana, and Iowa, visited Lincoln in Washington. General Ulysses S. Grant had just started to move south toward Richmond, and was asking for all the troops the federal government could muster. The governors, following Brough's recommendation, suggested that their states provide militia to serve for 100 days to hold forts and railroads around Washington, so that Grant could throw his whole strength against the rebel army. Lincoln agreed to the proposition and directed Stanton to execute it.

Under the plan, Brough pledged Ohio to provide 30,000 National Guards. The men were to be mustered in by May 2, with no bounty and no credit on any subsequent draft. Brough immediately went to work to raise the militia, catching the War Department napping—Stanton was late sending out mustering officers. The governor had soon raised more troops than he needed, but Stanton took them; Ohio eventually contributed over 34,000 militia for 100 days' service. Stanton praised Brough for his "patriotism and determination to spare no sacrifice to overthrow the rebellion." However, Brough did not escape criticism for his action; Democratic newspapers charged the governor had broken faith by sending some of the men to the front although he had assured them their duties would be confined to garrisoning. Also, the federal government was slow in mustering out the Ohio militiamen upon termination of their service, causing the governor much embarrassment. On September 3, after most of the men had returned, Brough delivered a speech at Circleville, assuring the National Guards that without their service, "the cause of the Union in all human probability would have been lost." He refused to answer charges that his action had been unconstitutional, suggesting that if it had, then the troops had "violated the Constitution for the country's good."⁸³

Recruiting near the close of Tod's administration had left Ohio ahead of her quota under regular calls. However, in February, 1864, Lincoln issued a fresh request for volunteers; additional calls followed in March, July, and December. Although, by 1864, most governors were demanding abandonment of the draft or liberal extension of federal bounties, Brough wrote Stanton in March to declare his support for conscription. He pointed out that since the government had postponed a draft scheduled for March 10, recruiting in Ohio had virtually stopped. Men would only be raised, he asserted, when Ohio-

ans realized the draft would be held. Brough also favored drafting for another reason—the state could ill afford to pay the high bounties used to encourage enlistment. Federal, state, county, and township bonuses multiplied until in some cases a soldier collected \$1,000 for volunteering. In spite of the bidding for recruits in Ohio, drafts had to be ordered for three of the four calls in 1864.⁸⁴

The drafts gave Brough much to worry about. Pausing in his efforts to meet the troop calls, quell suspected Copperhead plots, and encourage the Ohio National Guards being sent off to Washington, he asked Stanton if he had "anything cheering or consoling that you can give me?" Lincoln himself replied that "everything looks favorable for us." Brough, however, wanted more positive consolation; he felt if the state enrollment lists could be corrected, Ohio would not be liable to the draft. In July, when conscription began in the state, Brough complained that Ohio had an excess of 10,000 over previous calls. Provost Marshal General James B. Fry replied the draft would go on in delinquent districts, even though the whole state had an excess over the call. He expressed dismay that "the Governor should raise such a point to prevent the completion of a draft which was commenced at his earnest solicitation." Brough then asked that if the draft had to be made, the National Guards could be exempted so that shirks and stay-at-homes might be conscripted. The forty regiments called out for 100 days, he argued, had sifted out the Union men; now the government should draft Copperheads. Such action "would be hailed with gratification throughout the state." Stanton refused, saying he could not interfere with the terms of arrangement for the draft. Ex-Governor Tod then wrote the Secretary of War to request a reduction in military forces asked from Ohio. Perhaps as a consequence of Tod's intervention, and certainly as a result of the revision of credits for calls prior to January 1, 1864, Stanton did reduce the state's quota.⁸⁵

As conscription proceeded in Ohio through the summer of 1864, Brough worried about the danger of secret societies. Early in the year he had organized a system of spies, and maintained that they had uncovered a secret, treasonable organization in the state numbering close to 100,000 men. According to Brough, the insurrectionaries planned to destroy railroads and telegraph lines, seize arsenals in Columbus, release prisoners at Camp Chase, and co-operate with John Morgan who would launch a raid from Kentucky. Perhaps sitting up all night to receive confidential reports affected Brough's judgment; at any rate, no organized rebellion ever broke out. Brough warned Ohioans about "evil counsellors and bad men" who conspired against

the government, and advised federal officers to arrest leaders of the opposition to the draft, including Vallandigham, whom federal authorities were allowing to travel in Ohio unmolested. In August, as a draft was about to begin in the state, Brough warned Stanton that "force, and a good deal of it, will be required to overawe the resistance party." The Secretary assured the worried governor that if he had to call out any military forces to repeal invasion or preserve internal peace, the troops would be armed and paid by the federal government. Brough also worried about unrest in Kentucky and demanded that Washington authorities crack down on rebel sympathizers in the state. "Nothing but a vigorous application of Maryland policy," he asserted, "will save Kentucky, and the longer that is delayed the more dangerous Kentucky becomes."⁸⁶

Brough never hesitated to register his own opinions, regardless of the subject. In February, 1865, the contentious governor wrote Provost Marshal General Fry that the system of local bounties was full of corrupting influence that was traceable not so much to state and county government as to corrupt federal agents. Brough charged that at least half the provost marshals in Ohio should be removed. The governor also wrote fellow Ohioan Robert C. Schenck, of the House Military Affairs Committee, to complain of the red tape that hindered effective control of deputy provost marshals; he felt much corruption, delay, and expense could be eliminated by letting state authorities draft men under federal inspection and muster. Brough maintained that the whole quota system needed simplification: "It is necessary to bring it nearer to the people, where they can know its workings and hold some responsibility for it." Warning Schenck that "we are drifting upon the breakers," he asserted that a continuation of the present system threatened the whole Union war effort. Three days later, he again wrote the congressman, declaring that "the bounty system began with the General Government—that Government must assume the initiative in restraining it."⁸⁷

Just as Brough succeeded to the problems of recruiting that had faced his predecessors, so the new state executive inherited the role of "the soldier's friend." In his inaugural he reiterated Tod's recommendation to increase the tax for the aid of soldiers' families and, when he got a law to that effect, appealed to the military committees to make sure township and county officers distributed the funds fairly. Brough also increased the number of military agencies charged with watching over Ohio troops and endeavored to provide them with better management. In 1864, one such agent in Washington furnished almost 600,000 miles of transportation to enlisted men, collected pay

and claims for discharged soldiers, supplied relief to 10,000 troops who called at his office, visited hospitals in the vicinity, sent representatives to the armies of the Potomac and James, and disbursed over \$7,000 for the relief of sick and wounded. Brough continually urged his agents everywhere to "be vigilant and look well to every interest" of Ohioans in the army. The governor himself visited hospitals in Baltimore, Cincinnati, Columbus, and Madison, Indiana. When he found cause for dissatisfaction with the surgeons in charge of any hospital, he went straight to the United States Surgeon General to demand rectification of the wrongs.⁸⁸

In his efforts to succor Ohio troops, Brough came into conflict with the United States Sanitary Commission, which also sought to collect funds and disburse services to sick and wounded soldiers. The governor recognized that only through the efforts of his own agencies, and not through the Sanitary Commission, was a soldier's "attachment to his state quickened and increased." Thus Brough, certainly never one to avoid a fight, plunged into battle with the Commission. He criticized the agency for demanding a monopoly of donations and distribution and praised Indiana's system of providing a central society at the capital, under the immediate care of the governor, that received and distributed all contributions from the various aid societies. Brough felt his state agents were more prompt and energetic and provided a more economical and equitable distribution of supplies than the Sanitary Commission workers. He refused to let the Commission handle the state's money and stores, nor would he withdraw his own agents.⁸⁹

Although Brough worked hard to satisfy the demands of Ohioans serving in the army, he encountered strong opposition toward his promotion policy. His predecessor, Tod, had had similar troubles, and his efforts to promote soldiers on the merits of the individual case seemed to satisfy no one. Brough therefore decided to follow a strict rule of promotion by seniority, except in clear cases of incompetence; but this policy also led to bitter complaints from army officers and men. The governor's correspondence with protesting officers was often harsh, and Brough continually disregarded military etiquette and the communicant's dignity in asserting his final authority to make promotions. Though Brough thought he was being fair in following a seniority policy, he built up a reservoir of discontent among Ohio soldiers and officers that helped to defeat his political ambitions.⁹⁰

In 1864, a national election thrust itself into Ohio politics. Early in the year, Brough openly committed himself to Lincoln's renomination and attacked Secretary Chase, who was busy conniving for Lincoln's job. Union Republicans in Ohio quickly killed the Chase move-

ment in their state and sent a delegation headed by Tod and Dennison to the Unionist national convention in Baltimore. Dennison served as permanent chairman of the gathering, which endorsed Lincoln's renomination. After the decision was made, Ohio Republicans, led by Chase, settled down to campaign for the President. Thus the Union men were united, while Democrats were confused by a national platform calling war a failure and demanding cessation of hostilities and a candidate, General George B. McClellan, who gave no indication of stopping the war if elected. Brough found the Democratic platform full of hypocrisy and inconsistency and branded it a "base attempt to deceive the people of this country." He termed McClellan's military career a "magnificent failure," and said the country needed a statesman, not a general. The campaign was short and unexciting. In October, the Union party carried its state ticket by 54,000 votes, and won 17 of 19 Congressional seats. The next month, Lincoln took Ohio with a 60,055 majority.⁹¹

For several months after the 1864 elections, Brough faced no political problems; however, in the spring of 1865, he, as had Dennison and Tod, faced the question of his own renomination. Brough's contentiousness had led him to make more than his share of enemies. Now that the war was almost over, Republicans who were tired of nominating old Democrats wanted one of their own number selected. Ohioans serving in the army wanted a military man for a candidate, and officers still nursed grudges against Brough's promotion policy. Brough debated his chances, and, on June 15, told the people of Ohio that he would not be an active candidate for re-election. However, he added, due to "pressing importunities from nearly every section of the State," he would not decline the nomination if he were presented with it. The Unionist party, taking the governor at his word, ignored him and proceeded to nominate General Jacob D. Cox. Brough then turned away from politics to finish his official duties as governor. The war had ended and disbanding the army occupied much of his attention.⁹²

In the midst of his labors, Brough's health began to give way. The governor sprained his ankle, and, in leaning his great bulk on a cane, bruised his hand; soon he had contracted gangrene in both hand and foot. On August 29, 1865, after a protracted and painful illness, Ohio's third and last war governor died.⁹³ Brough had been the most vigorous, and also the most unpopular, of the three. Although he had had neither to grapple with the rush of momentous new questions that had faced Dennison, nor to cope with gloomy periods of wartime depression like Tod, Brough had still managed to become embroiled

in more than his share of disputes. Yet he, like his two predecessors, had given his full efforts to serving his state.

David Tod, the oldest of Ohio's three war governors, died one year after Brough. Tod, never noted for adhering to one view for any length of time, had changed his mind about the Negro; in 1866, he defended Congressional reconstruction measures aimed at protecting the Negro in the South and supported universal suffrage in Ohio. William Dennison, the youngest of the three governors, lived the longest and died on June 15, 1882. Dennison remained in the cabinet after Lincoln's assassination, but soon became involved in the battles between President Johnson and Republican radicals in Congress. The ex-governor at first sought to reconcile the differences between the two factions, but in July, 1866, deciding he favored the radicals' position, he resigned his post. Dennison still harbored ambitions for a senatorship; and, in 1880, he ran for Allen G. Thurman's seat in the upper house, but lost to James A. Garfield.⁹⁴

In spite of the fact that not one of the three governors was renominated by his party, each executive had served his constituents with energy and ability. Dennison's job had been the hardest; it was he who had to consider the question of compromise, alter the state administrative system to meet the new demands of war, answer the first troop calls, and strive to save the border states for the Union. Dennison, himself inexperienced, suffered from the incompetence of the War Department, which was slow to take up the responsibility of directing the war effort. However, by the time Brough became governor, the federal government had assumed many of the duties heretofore filled by state executives; Brough protested that he had too little control over the raising and organization of troops.

The gubernatorial careers of all three men indicate that despite the terrific strains and stresses of directing a state in time of war, the ultimate problem they had to solve was a political one. Even during the Civil War, campaigns and elections went on as usual, and governors had to be nominated and elected. Thus Dennison, Tod, and Brough each sought to satisfy the various factions that composed their party. Dennison had to conciliate radical Republicans from the Western Reserve and conservatives from the Ohio River counties; and although he might have done that, he could not propitiate war Democrats who were co-operating in the growing Unionist movement. Tod and Brough, themselves products of the Unionist party, faced the impossible task of trying to satisfy the whole spectrum of opinion that composed the new organization. Though each governor

was selected because he best answered the political problems of the moment, once in office he found it impossible to maintain his availability. Ohio was indeed fortunate that her war governors, chosen primarily for their political qualifications, proved to be able executives capable of meeting the demands of four years of civil war.

1. Eugene H. Roseboom, *The Civil War Era, 1850-1873* (History of the State of Ohio, ed. Carl F. Wittke, Vol. IV [Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society, 1944]), pp. 277-339; George H. Porter, *Ohio Politics During the Civil War Period* ("Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law," Vol. XL, [New York: Columbia University Press, 1911]), pp. 1-22.
2. Homer C. Hockett, "William Dennison," *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928-58), V, 241-42; Whitelaw Reid, *Ohio in the War* (Cincinnati: Moore, Wiltstach and Baldwin, 1868), I, 1017-19; Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, p. 255.
3. Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, pp. 313-72; Lincoln to Samuel Galloway, July 28, 1859, in *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Roy P. Basler, (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953-55), III, 394-95.
4. Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 23-36.
5. Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 26-27; Hockett, *loc. cit.*; Roseboom *Civil War Era*, p. 381.
6. *Ohio Executive Documents, 1859*, Part 2, pp. 163-80.
7. Madison Bratton, "The Unionist Junket of the Legislatures of Tennessee and Kentucky in January, 1860," "East Tennessee Historical Society Publications," No. 7 (1935), pp. 64-80; *Excursion Made by the Executives and Legislatures of the States of Kentucky and Tennessee* (Cincinnati: Robt. Clarke & Co., 1860), pp. 1-53.
8. *Ohio Executive Documents, 1860*, Part 1, pp. 103-17; Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, p. 359; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 38-40, 69; *Columbus Crisis*, April 25, 1861.
9. William B. Hesseltine (ed.), *Three Against Lincoln: Murat Halstead Reports the Causes of 1860* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1960), pp. 120, 143, 163, 171; Frederick W. Seward, *Seward at Washington* (New York: Derby and Miller, 1891), II, 447; Donnal V. Smith, *Chase and Civil War Politics* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society, 1931), p. 16; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 43-48; Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, p. 371.
10. Dennison to Joshua Giddings, January 8, 1861, Giddings, MSS, Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society Library; *Ohio Executive Documents, 1860*, Part 1, pp. 557-64; *New York Tribune*, January 10, 1861; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 55-56.
11. *Ohio Senate Journal, 1861*, pp. 15, 19, 177; *Ohio House Journal, 1861*, pp. 91, 346; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 71-72.
12. Henry G. Pearson, *The Life of John A. Andrew* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1904), I, 154; *Ohio Senate Journal, 1861*, pp. 47-48; *Columbus Crisis*, February 7, 1861; Robert G. Gunderson, *Old Gentlemen's Convention: The Washington Peace Conference of 1861* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961), pp. 33, 36-37, 61, 90; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, p. 68.
13. William E. Baringer, *A House Dividing* (Springfield, Ill.: Abraham Lincoln Association, 1945), p. 275; Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, p. 379.
14. *Columbus Crisis*, March 28, 1861; *Cincinnati Enquirer*, March 16, 20, 22, 1861; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 70-71.
15. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series 3, I, 68-69, 73; *Ohio Executive Documents, 1861*, Part 1, pp. 375-76; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 73-75.
16. *Columbus Crisis*, April 18, May 23, 1861; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 20 ff; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 75, 77-78.
17. *Ohio Executive Documents, 1860*, Part 1, pp. 103-17, 553-54; *Ohio Executive Documents, 1861*, Part 1, pp. 379-81; Emilius O. Randall and Daniel J. Ryan, *History of Ohio: The Rise and Progress of an American State* (New York: Century History Co.,

OHIO'S CIVIL WAR GOVERNORS

1912-1915), IV, 159; *Columbus Crisis*, April 25, 1861; Jacob D. Cox, *Military Reminiscences of the Civil War* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1900) I, 10; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, I, 114, 147, 159, 183, 610-11, 755.

18. Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 26-27, 31, 32-36, 54; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, I, 97-98. The governor had originally hoped that McClellan would remain in Columbus to handle military matters, but within a few weeks, with the assistance of Chase, he helped McClellan obtain a commission as major-general in the United States Army.

19. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, I, 101-102, 136; *ibid.*, Series 1, LI, Part 1, 333-34; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 25; Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 159.

20. William B. Hesseltine and Hazel C. Wolf, "The Cleveland Conference of 1861," *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*, LVI (1947), 258-65; John Bigelow, *Retrospections of an Active Life* (New York: Baker and Taylor Co., 1909-1913), I, 349-51.

21. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, I, 84; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 28-31; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1861, Part 2, pp. 413-16, 418-19; Stephen Z. Starr, "Camp Dennison, 1861-1865," *Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio Bulletin*, XIX (1961), 167-68.

22. Starr, "Camp Dennison," pp. 167-85; Cox, *Military Reminiscences*, I, 12, 18-19, 20-32; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, IV, 206; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 35-36, 43-44; *Columbus Crisis*, April 25, May 2, 9, 16, 1861.

23. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1861, Part 1, pp. 165-69; Starr, "Camp Dennison," 175-76; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, I, 416.

24. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, III, 439, 441; *ibid.*, Series 1, VII, 443; *ibid.*, Series 3, 447, 469-73, 495-96, 519-20, 732-34; Basler, *Lincoln Works*, IV, 550.

25. *Columbus Crisis*, October 3, 1861; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1861, Part 1, pp. 377-78.

26. Starr, "Camp Dennison," pp. 186-87; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, I, 227, 242-43, 264-65, 357; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1861, Part 1, pp. 153-57, 165-69, 362-65; *Columbus Crisis*, May 23, June 7, 18, 1861.

27. Lebanon Citizen quoted in *Columbus Crisis*, August 8, 1861; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, I, 469-73; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1861, Part 1, pp. 362-65, 402; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 61; *Columbus Crisis*, October 17, 1861; January 16, March 16, 1862.

28. *Columbus Crisis*, May 16, 23, 1861; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 39-41; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, LII, Part 2, 69; *ibid.*, Series 3, I, 84, 95, 101, 475; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1861, Part 1, p. 412.

29. William B. Hesseltine and Hazel C. Wolf, "Kentucky's Last Peace Effort," *Register of Kentucky History*, XLV (1947), 335-39; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1861, Part 1, pp. 410-12; *Columbus Crisis*, May 9, 1861.

30. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1861, Part 1, pp. 397-99, 401-2; *Columbus Crisis*, May 9, 1861.

31. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, XLV, Part 1, 146-47; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 38.

32. Salmon P. Chase to William Dennison, April 20, 1861, *Ohio Executive Records*, Box 198; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 39, 46-48; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, LI, Part 1, 383, 391; *Columbus Crisis*, May 30, June 13, 1861; Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, p. 387; Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 167-68.

33. Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 56; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1861, Part 1, pp. 153-57.

34. Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 32-35, 42; *Columbus Crisis*, August 22, 29, October 17, 1861; Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 170-71; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 78-79.

35. *Columbus Crisis*, June 13, 1861; November 14, 1861; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, 87-90.

36. *Columbus Crisis*, January 9, 1862; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 62.

37. Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 165-69, 170-71; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 62-63; Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, pp. 381, 388.

38. *Columbus Crisis*, September 19, 1861; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1861, Part 1, pp. 481-87; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, 90.

39. Gideon Welles, *Diary of Gideon Welles*, ed. Howard K. Beale (New York: W. W. Norton, 1960), II, 403-404; George B. Wright, "Honorable David Tod: Biography and Personal Recollections," *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*, VII (1899), 101-105, 115-16; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 42-43.
40. Edgar Allen Holt, *Party Politics in Ohio, 1840-1850* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society, 1931), pp. 116, 121, 135-40, 246-47, 419; Eugene H. Roseboom, "David Tod," *Dictionary of American Biography*, XVIII, 567-68; C. B. Galbreath, "Ohio's Fugitive Slave Law," *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Quarterly*, XXXIV (1925), 220-22.
41. Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 53-54; *Columbus Crisis*, September 12, 1861; January 2, 1862; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 1020-21; Holt, *Party Politics*, p. 146 n; Clement M. Silvestro, "Samuel Medary" (Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1951), pp. 92-93.
42. Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 64-65.
43. James G. Randall, *Civil War and Reconstruction* (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1937), p. 420; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 69-70; *Columbus Crisis*, May 28, 1862; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, II, 100.
44. William B. Hesseltine, *Lincoln and the War Governors* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), pp. 198-200; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, II, 196.
45. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, II, 66-67, 213, 320, 538; *Columbus Crisis*, January 7, 1863.
46. *Ohio Executive Records*, Box 208; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, II, 458-59, 493, 548, 650, 946; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1862, Part 1, pp. 100-104, 117; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 71-75.
47. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, II, 355, 386, 549; Pearson, *The Life of John A. Andrew*, II, 24.
48. William B. Hesseltine and Hazel C. Wolf, "The Altoona Conference and the Emancipation Proclamation," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, LXXI (1947), 195-205; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, II, 219; Cox, *Military Reminiscences*, I, 355-56; Basler, *Lincoln Works*, V, 155 n.; *Columbus Crisis*, October 1, 1862; *Welles Diary*, II, 153.
49. *New York Times*, June 10, 1862; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, 102-9; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 82.
50. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1862, Part 1, pp. 7-21; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, III, 8; *Welles Diary*, II, 219.
51. Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 110-11; *Columbus Crisis*, April 2, 1862; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 130-33; Delmar J. Trester, "David Tod," in *The Governors of Ohio* (Columbus, O.: Ohio Historical Society, 1954), pp. 80-82.
52. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, III, 35-36, 185-86.
53. *Ibid.*, Series 1, XXVII, Part 3, 144; *ibid.*, Series 3, III, 364-65, 798-99, 916; *Columbus Crisis*, September 9, 1863.
54. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, III, 44-45, 229, 372, 402, 822; *ibid.*, Series 3, IV, 25; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1863, Part 1, pp. 270-76; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 176-77; *Columbus Crisis*, September 17, 1862.
55. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, II, 104-5.
56. Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 83-88.
57. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, II, 285; Yates to Tod, August 11, 1862, *Ohio Executive Records*, Box 208.
58. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1862, Part 1, pp. 82-88; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 88-91.
59. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1862, Part 1, pp. 88-92; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 91-95.
60. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, XVI, Part 2, 529; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 95-98; *Ohio Executive Documents* 1862, Part 1, pp. 92-95; *Columbus Crisis*, May 13, 1863.
61. Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, pp. 423-26; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 139-51; *Columbus Crisis*, July 22, 1863.
62. *War of the Rebellion*, Series I, XXIX, Part 2, 585-87; *ibid.*, Series 2, VI, 402, 415, 495; *ibid.*, Series 3, III, 1013, 1024.

OHIO'S CIVIL WAR GOVERNORS

63. Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 185-87.
64. *Columbus Crisis*, September 10, 1862; March 25, April 15, 1863; Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 213-14; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 79-80; Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, p. 411.
65. J. R. Wavely to Tod, April 7, (?) Kinley to Tod, October 9, 1863, *Ohio Executive MSS*; *Columbus Crisis*, February 18, March 4, 1863; *New York Tribune*, November 2, 1863.
66. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, III, 349, 356.
67. *Ibid.*, Series I, XXIII, 395-97; *ibid.*; Series 3, III, 403; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1863, Part 1, p. 297; *Columbus Crisis*, July 29, 1863; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 125-29.
68. *Maboning Sentinel* quoted in *Columbus Crisis*, May 20, 1863; *ibid.*, May 13, 1863.
69. *Ibid.*, April 16, 30, 1862; January 7, 1863; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1862, Part 1, pp. 74-81; Part 2, pp. 431, 495-516; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 65-68.
70. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1863, Part 1, pp. 127-62; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, XXX, Part 3, 760, 872, 892; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 177-78.
71. Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, 406-16; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 154; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, 144-56, 172-74.
72. *Columbus Crisis*, February 11, May 13, 1863; Porter, *Ohio Politics*, 113-15; Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 231-32.
73. *Columbus Crisis*, June 17, July 8, 1863; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 166; Basler, *Lincoln Works*, VI, 287 n.
74. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, III, 380; Basler, *Lincoln Works*, VI, 287.
75. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1863, Part 1, pp. 7-14.
76. Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 172, 181; Basler, *Lincoln Works*, VIII, 420, 420 n.; Edward Bates, *The Diary of Edward Bates, 1859-1866*, ed. Howard K. Beale ("Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1930," Vol. IV [Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1933]), p. 381; John Hay, *Lincoln and the Civil War in the Diaries and Letters of John Hay*, selected and edited by Tyler Dennett (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1939), p. 198; *Welles Diary*, II, 62-63, 64.
77. Porter, *Ohio Politics*, p. 119.
78. Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 1022-26; Frederick W. Ashley, "John Brough," *Dictionary of American Biography*, III, 94-95; Osman C. Hooper, "John Brough," *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*, XLII (1904), 40-50; Edgar Ervin, "Birthplace of John Brough," *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly*, XVII (1908), 105-11; Richard A. Knopf, "John Brough," *Governors of Ohio*, pp. 83-85; Holt, *Party Politics*, pp. 21, 68-73, 220, 419; Galbreath, "Ohio's Fugitive Slave Law," pp. 220, 221.
79. Basler, *Lincoln Works*, II, 211-12, 212 n.; *Columbus Crisis*, July 8, August 5, September 23, 1863; "Minutes of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society," "Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications," IV (1895), 444; Smith, *Chase and Civil War Politics*, p. 72.
80. *Columbus Crisis*, July 8, September 16, 1863; Randall and Ryan, *History of Ohio*, IV, 236-37.
81. Hesselstine, *Lincoln and the War Governors*, pp. 333-35; Basler, *Lincoln Works*, IV, 515 n.; Francis P. Weisenburger, "Lincoln's Ohio Friends," *Ohio Historical Quarterly*, LXVIII (1959), 247; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 169; Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, 416-23; *New York Tribune*, November 5, 1863; *Welles Diary*, I, 470.
82. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1863, Part 1, pp. 305-12.
83. Basler, *Lincoln Works*, VII, 308, 312-13; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, XLIII, Part 1, 916; *ibid.*, Series 3, IV, 237-38, 411; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 208-20; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1864, Part 1, pp. 71-76; *Columbus Crisis*, June 22, 1864; John Brough, *The Defenders of the Country and Its Enemies* (Cincinnati: The Gazette Co., 1864), p. 4.
84. Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 200-201; Fred A. Shannon, *The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865* (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1928), II, 125; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, IV, 180.

OHIO'S CIVIL WAR GOVERNORS

85. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, XXXVII, Part 1, 380; *ibid.*, Series 3, IV, 263, 265, 266, 281, 405, 471, 494-95, 503, 515, 632-33; *Columbus Crisis*, May 11, June 8, 1864; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1864, Part 1, pp. 76-79.
86. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1864, Part 2, pp. 73-75; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 202; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 2, VII, 325, 371, 372, 803; *ibid.*, Series 3, IV, 425, 429, 569, 579, 599, 620, 1286-87; *John Hay Diary*, pp. 187-94; Frank L. Klement, *Copperheads in the Middle West* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 180-81.
87. *War of the Rebellion*, Series 3, IV, 1149-51; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, 205-7.
88. Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 183-85, 186, 194-96, 198; *War of the Rebellion*, Series 1, XXXIX, Part 2, 381; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1864, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.
89. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1864, Part 1, pp. 51-53, 132-33; William D. Foulke, *Life of Oliver P. Morton* (Indianapolis: Bowen Merrill Co., 1899), I, 164 n.; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 190-93.
90. *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1864, Part 2, pp. 42-44; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 221 ff.
91. Porter, *Ohio Politics*, pp. 190-99; Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, pp. 429-35; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 231-32; John Brough, "The Defenders of the Country," pp. 5-7.
92. Porter, *Ohio Politics*, p. 205; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 229-30; Roseboom, *Civil War Era*, pp. 426-29.
93. Ashley, "Brough," *Dictionary of American Biography*, III, 94-95; *Ohio Executive Documents*, 1865, Part 1, pp. 13-15, 243-49; Reid, *Ohio in the War*, I, 236-39.
94. Porter, *Ohio Politics*, p. 241; *Welles Diary*, II, 301, 419, 425, 446, 464, 536, 543-44, 557; Hockett, "Dennison," *Dictionary of American Biography*, V, 241-42.

1860 1862

1862 1864

cover by suzanne todhunter

1864 1865